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THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK: STEALTH
PROCEDURES AND THE EROSION OF STARE
DECISIS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Amy E. Sloan*
Informal en banc review is a procedural expedient that nine of the
thirteen federal circuits use to circumvent the requirements of formal en
banc review. Panels invoke informal en banc review to overrule prior
panel precedent in contravention of the law of the circuit rule, as well as to
take other actions normally reserved for the full court sitting en banc. The
circuits that use informal en banc review say the procedure is to be used
rarely. In practice, however, the frequency of informal en banc review is
significant when compared with formal en banc review.
Informal en banc review is a stealth procedure that is virtually beyond
review because the federal appellate courts both authorize and implement it
on their own. The procedure is difficult to track because the action
triggering informal en banc review is often buried in footnotes. Informal en
banc review is more efficient than formal en banc review, but the efficiency
benefits come at a price. Informal en banc review is used arbitrarily.
Courts should not hide changes to the law in footnotes because their
actions should be transparent, and using footnotes to change the law makes
legal research difficult. The procedure appears to be used
disproportionately in criminal cases, and in all cases in which it is used, it
deprives the parties of the opportunity to participate in the decisional
process. The procedure can also damage judicial collegiality by depriving
minority-view judges of opportunities to present their views. Informal en
banc opinions inject uncertainty into the system of precedent because their
precedential status is unclear. Further, informal en banc review can result
in poor decision making when changes to the law are based on incomplete
information.
This Article explores informal en banc review in depth. It traces the
history and use of informal en banc review by detailing the circumstances
under which the procedure is used. It then analyzes the advantages and
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disadvantages of informal en banc review and proposes procedures to
ensure that informal en bane review is used only on legitimate terms.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last generation, the federal courts of appeals have implemented
a number of procedures that shortcut traditional appellate decisionmaking
processes in an effort to manage burgeoning case loads. For example, they
decide cases without oral argument, use staff attorneys and clerks to draft
opinions, and issue the vast majority of their written dispositions as
nonprecedential opinions. 1 All of these procedures have been critiqued in
1. See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency,
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273
(1996).
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legal scholarship. 2 One similar expedient that has not received careful
scrutiny is "mini" or "informal" en banc review, a procedure nine of the
thirteen federal appellate circuits use to circumvent the requirements of
formal en banc review.3 Panels invoke informal en banc review to overrule
prior panel precedent in contravention of the law of the circuit rule, as well
as to take other actions normally reserved for the full court sitting en banc. 4
This might not matter if informal en banc cases were "hen's-teeth rare." 5
Two circuits, however, use it more frequently than formal en banc review,
and three others use it often enough in comparison to the number of formal
en banc cases to be noteworthy. 6
One reason informal en banc review has not been studied in depth is its
stealth. Informal en banc cases are hard to find because panels routinely
bury the action triggering informal en banc review in footnotes. 7 Until very
recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's
policy statement implementing the practice was unavailable to the public. 8
The practice is virtually beyond review because the federal appellate courts
both authorize and implement it on their own. The federal appellate courts
themselves rarely discuss informal en banc review in their opinions, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has never weighed in on the practice. Because it is an
internal court process that panels invoke sua sponte, parties cannot predict
when they may become subject to it or participate in persuading the other
members of the court to their positions. 9
This Article explores informal en banc review in depth. Part II details
the history and use of informal en banc review. It discusses the relationship
between stare decisis and the law of the circuit rule, which provides that the
court must convene en banc to overrule a prior panel opinion, and explains
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual
Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685 (2001); Penelope Pether,
Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law,
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2007); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1. The earliest critique of
nonprecedential opinions appeared over thirty years ago. William M. Richman & William
L. Reynolds, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules
in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978).
3. Although informal en banc review is mentioned in legal scholarship from time to
time, see, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008, 1042-43 (1991), it has been the subject of only one article,
Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit
Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986). See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due
Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011, 1045 n.136 (2003) (noting the lack of studies tracking
use of informal en banc review and opining that it is used infrequently). This form of review
is sometimes called "mini" en banc review. See, e.g., United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220,
230 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 268 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cabranes, J.,
concurring). This Article, however, uses the term informal en banc.
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. United States v. Guzmin, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005).
6. See infra p. 728, fig. 1 and Part III.B. 1.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra notes 138-40.
9. See infra Part llI.B.5.
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the differences between formal and informal en banc review. It also traces
the history of the development of informal en banc review in the circuits
that use it and provides data on the frequency and circumstances under
which it is used.' 0
In Part III, this Article explores the advantages and disadvantages of
informal en banc review. Informal en banc review is not wholly
illegitimate. Courts have the judicial power to use it, and the practice has
some advantages. To the extent that informal en banc review brings full
court consideration to a greater number of issues than would be possible
through formal en banc review, it may benefit litigants and the judicial
system. This is especially true when panels use it to obtain the full court's
agreement on issues that do not necessarily require formal en banc
consideration, such as questions of first impression. The "behind the
scenes" nature of the procedure can also benefit the collegiality of the court
because it keeps judges from questioning the work of colleagues in public,
as often occurs with formal en banc review. I I
Just because the federal appellate courts can use informal en banc review,
however, does not mean that they should. The advantages this shortcut
practice provides come at a price. Informal en banc review is used
arbitrarily because most circuits lack standards governing when the
procedure is appropriately used, consequently undermining principles of
stare decisis. Hiding changes to the law in footnotes is contrary to the
transparency required of the judicial process and makes legal research
unnecessarily difficult. A review of cases indicates that informal en banc
review may disproportionately affect criminal defendants, a group
traditionally marginalized by the court system. And although informal en
banc review can in some ways improve collegiality, it can also undermine
relations among judges by allowing a panel to change the law without
giving judges who oppose the panel's action sufficient opportunity to
present their views. The "behind the scenes" nature of the procedure also
deprives litigants of meaningful opportunity to participate in the decisional
process. The uncertain precedential status of informal en banc opinions and
the risk that judges will agree to changes in the law without sufficient
information or consideration are further disadvantages of the procedure. 12
Given these advantages and disadvantages, this Article proposes
formalizing the standards and processes for use of informal en banc review
to ensure that the federal courts invoke the practice only under legitimate
conditions. It argues that the federal appellate courts should not use
informal en banc review to overrule prior panel precedent. Using informal
en banc review this way risks arbitrary decision making and threatens
judicial legitimacy, and these disadvantages outweigh any efficiency
advantages. If the federal appellate courts choose to use informal en banc
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.B.
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review in other circumstances, they need to articulate clear procedures
governing the practice. Informal en banc dispositions should be
unanimously approved and should not be relegated to footnotes. In
authorizing informal en banc review, the federal appellate courts should act
through adjudication, not through local rules or internal operating
procedures, because adjudication is the appropriate vehicle for making rules
of precedent. 13
This Article concludes that the federal appellate courts should not be
unduly restrained in their ability to craft procedures short of formal en banc
review to develop circuit precedent. But the courts must carefully monitor
the ways these policies are used to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the
judiciary. 14
I. OVERVIEW OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL EN BANC PROCEDURES
A. Formal En Banc Review
To understand informal en banc review, it is important to understand
formal en banc review and its relationship to stare decisis. Stare decisis
operates in two directions: vertically and horizontally. 15  Vertical stare
decisis refers to the requirement that lower tribunals within a court structure
follow the decisions of higher tribunals. 16 Horizontal stare decisis refers to
the rule that courts adhere to their own prior decisions. 17 In the federal
court system, horizontal stare decisis obtains only at the appellate level;
because federal district court decisions are not binding on later tribunals, 18
those courts are never constrained to follow their own prior opinions. At
the appellate level, the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court do not have
to follow their own opinions, but they also do not routinely disregard
them. 19 The federal appellate courts must balance the need to follow their
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Conclusion.
15. Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REv. 813, 827 (2008);
Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 712 n.6 (2004).
16. RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD § 7.01, at 79 (1997).
17. Id. ("[P]recedent applies, overall, with equal force in the same court as in its
inferiors (excluding the power to overrule).").
18. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that federal trial
court opinions are not binding precedent); Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928
F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that "there is no such thing as 'the law of the
district,"' such that federal district court opinions are not binding in later cases); Charles A.
Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1143, 1179 (2006) (noting that federal district court
opinions do not bind later courts).
19. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("We approach the
reconsideration of decisions of this Court with the utmost caution .... [b]ut '[s]tare decisis
is not an inexorable command.' (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)));
see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 9-14 (2008) (discussing patterns
in the U.S. Supreme Court's overruling of its own precedent).
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own prior opinions against the need for the law to evolve.20 The preferred
course of action is for courts to follow their own prior opinions for the sake
of consistency and social stability. People need to know the rules that
govern their conduct to organize their lives, and basic fairness requires that
similarly situated parties be treated similarly.21 Further, the amount of
work the courts would have to do if they had to revisit each question anew
in each case would be overwhelming. 22 On the other hand, this policy
cannot be inflexible. Circumstances change, and sometimes opinions are
poorly reasoned or outright wrong.23 Therefore, the requirement that courts
at the same level follow their own prior opinions is not as strong as the
requirement of vertical stare decisis.2 4 Indeed, horizontal stare decisis has
been characterized as a policy subject to exception rather than as a rule
requiring adherence at all times. 25 As one court explained, horizontal
"stare decisis is neither a straightjacket nor an immutable rule." 26
In the federal appellate courts, the law of the circuit rule implements the
policy of horizontal stare decisis. 27 The law of the circuit rule provides that
the decision of one panel is the decision of the court and binds all future
panels unless and until the panel's opinion is reversed or overruled, either
20. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that vertical stare decisis is the simplest form to apply because it is based on the hierarchical
relationship between courts, but that the relationship between a court and its own prior
opinions is the most complex).
21. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (noting that adherence to prior precedent "is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process"); see also CAPPALLI, supra note 16, §§ 7.05-07, at 80-83
(explaining the purposes of stare decisis).
22. CAPPALLI, supra note 16, §§ 7.15-.16, at 87-88 ("Without a system of binding
precedent lawyers would be encouraged to raise the same questions again and again, adding
to the court's already intolerable caseloads.").
23. See id. § 7.20, at 90 ("Horizontal precedent applies vigorously and the image of law
demands as much. But the need to adjust doctrine to current realities and needs beckons
also.").
24. See, e.g., Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123 (explaining that opinions of superior courts bind
subsidiary tribunals and that, while a court must give considerable weight to its own prior
opinions, it "is not absolutely bound by them, and must give fair consideration to any
substantial argument that a litigant makes for overruling a previous decision").
25. See, e.g., Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me., Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir.
2004) (explaining that, although a justice system based on precedent favors the values of
finality, stability, and certainty, stare decisis is not an immutable rule, and panels of a court
of appeals have some modest amount of flexibility to reevaluate the circuit's own
precedents); see also CAPPALLI, supra note 16, § 7.14, at 86 (explaining that stare decisis is a
doctrine of "flexible stability," with the "flex" coming from the power to overrule, and the
"stability" from the courts' strong reluctance to do so).
26. Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir.
2000).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Guzmdn, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that
later panels are ordinarily bound by prior panel decisions and characterizing this requirement
as the "law-of-the-circuit doctrine"); Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 349 (explaining that the rule that
later panels are bound by earlier panel decisions is "a specialized application of the stare
decisis principle").
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by the circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.28 Every circuit follows
the law of the circuit rule.29 Statements of the rule in judicial opinions are
echoed in several courts' local rules and internal operating procedures. 30
Although the law of the circuit rule is the general rule, it is somewhat
elastic in application. 31  Sometimes courts state the rule especially
strongly. 32 Other times, the expression of the rule is more relaxed. 33 Even
28. See, e.g., Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2007); Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Swann v. S. Health Partners,
Inc., 388 F.3d 834 (1 1th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir.
2004); United States v Pena-Sarabia, 297 F.3d 983, 989 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Chong, 285 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2001); Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d
738 (8th Cir. 2001); BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 535
(2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Cont'l Airlines (In re Cont'l Airlines), 134 F.3d 536 (3rd
Cir. 1998); Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d
33, 38 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993); Colby, 811 F.2d at
1123; United States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
29. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Mesias v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 2008); Gandara v.
Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Brubaker Amusement Co. v. United States, 304
F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2002); E.
Pilots Merger Comm. v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc.), 279 F.3d 226, 233
& n.4 (3d Cir. 2002); Walker v. S. Co. Servs., 279 F.3d 1289, 1293 (1 1th Cir. 2002); United
States v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2002); Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1035
(6th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2001); Nat'l Council
of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Mentavlos v.
Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 312 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739
(8th Cir. 2001); Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001); Summum v.
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 912 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d
695, 697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997). See generally Alan R. Gilbert, Annotation, In Banc
Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals, 37 A.L.R. FED. 274, § 5 (1978 & Supp. 2008-09)
(collecting cases).
30. FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(1) ("[O]nly the court en banc may overrule a binding
precedent .. "); 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this
court that the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous
panel. Court en banc consideration is required to do so."); 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) ("Reported
panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a
published opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is required to overrule a
published opinion of the court.").
31. See Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District of
Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 480 (1986) (explaining that the application of
the law of the circuit rule is not as tidy as a simple statement of the rule would suggest).
32. Guzmdn, 419 F.3d at 31 (characterizing itself as "firmly bound" by the court's prior
panel opinions and noting that the law of the circuit rule applies to prior panel opinions even
when those opinions are closely, but not directly, on point); Wilkerson, 361 F.3d at 732
(stating that if the panel were the first to address the issue presented in the case, it might
have reached a different conclusion, but deeming itself bound by prior panel opinions
pending overruling by the court en banc or the Supreme Court); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d
1021, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) ("It is the firm rule of this circuit that we cannot
disregard the precedent set by a prior panel, even though we perceive error in the precedent.
Absent an intervening Supreme Court decision which changes the law, only the en banc
court can make the change."); In re Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 485 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1973)
("Indeed, it is only through the Court En Banc that precedents established by earlier panel
decision may be reexamined."). Indeed, when faced with conflicting circuit precedents, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has disregarded the later case on the ground that
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when the rule is stated in relatively strong terms, it is, like virtually every
other rule, subject to exceptions. If a prior panel decision has been
invalidated by the passage of a statute or intervening Supreme Court, en
banc circuit, or, on issues of state law, state precedent, the court does not
have to convene en banc to overrule the invalidated precedent. 34 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken this exception farther than
the other circuits, holding in 2003 that, not only are prior panels free to
'disregard opinions undermined by later Supreme Court opinions, but so also
are district courts. 35
The precise limits of the intervening-authority exception can be difficult
to define. For example, when a panel opinion is based on a circuit
precedent that is later reversed by the Supreme Court, the exception to the
law of the circuit rule applies, and the panel opinion can be disregarded by
later panels as fatally undermined. The line from the panel opinion to the
contrary Supreme Court opinion in that instance is clear. But sometimes
the relationship between a panel opinion and later, contrary precedent is not
so clear. Courts sometimes invoke a corollary to the intervening-authority
exception that applies when later superior authority that is not directly on
point legitimately calls into question a subsidiary tribunal's prior opinion. 36
the later panel lacked the power to rule in a manner contrary to the earlier opinion. Wilson,
658 F.2d at 1035; see also Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir.
Unit A May 1981) (making the point that a later panel is without power to rule differently
than an earlier panel, but determining that intervening superior authority rendered the earlier
case invalid). Contra Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775,
779 (8th Cir. 1990) (determining, when faced with conflicting circuit precedents, that it
should follow the earlier panel opinion because it was better reasoned).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 224-25 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
law of the circuit doctrine has soft edges; it is 'neither a straightjacket nor an immutable
rule."' (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 142
(1st Cir. 2000))). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears to take the most
relaxed view of any of the federal circuits, saying that courts are not absolutely bound by
their own prior opinions "and must give fair consideration to any substantial argument that a
litigant makes for overruling a previous decision." Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir. 2007)
(explaining that an exception to stare decisis applies when a prior opinion is undermined by
subsequent controlling authority, including a Supreme Court opinion, a circuit en banc
opinion, or a statute); Cooper v. Cent. & Sw. Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001)
(stating that, unless a state's courts have changed the law, a prior panel decision on a
question of state law is binding on a later panel); Martin, 254 F.3d at 577 (recognizing that a
Supreme Court decision may render a prior panel decision invalid and thus empower a later
panel to overrule an earlier panel's opinion); United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206, 209 n.l
(9th Cir. 1985) (explaining circumstances under which a panel opinion undermined by a later
en banc opinion can be reexamined).
35. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The opinion holds that
neither U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appellate panels nor district courts within
that circuit are bound to follow prior panel or en banc opinions that are "clearly
irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority." Id. at 893.
Interestingly, the court made this change to the law of the circuit rule with a formal en banc
opinion. For a discussion of this case, see generally, Recent Cases, 117 HARV. L. REv. 719
(2003).
36. See, e.g., Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me., Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 350 (1st Cir.
2004).
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The circumstances justifying application of this corollary have been
characterized as "hen's-teeth rare," 37 suggesting that it is not often invoked.
In fact, however, the corollary has been described in more generous terms
as applying when later authority, "although not directly controlling, may
nevertheless offer a compelling reason for believing that the former panel,
in light of new developments, would change its collective mind. '38
Legitimately called into question is different from a change of mind, thus
illustrating the slipperiness of this exception. The fuzzy margins of the
exception only serve to underscore the nature of the law of the circuit rule
as a somewhat flexible policy rather than a rigidly applied rule.
Exceptions notwithstanding, horizontal stare decisis is generally
observed in the federal circuit courts through the requirement that the court
sit en banc to overrule panel opinions. 39 The use of en banc review
developed from the evolution of the federal appellate courts. 40 The circuits
each originally consisted of only three judges. 41 Thus, the decision of an
individual three-judge panel by definition constituted the decision of the
entire circuit. Over time, more judges were added to some circuits.42 A
circuit split developed regarding whether a case could be heard by all of the
judges sitting together or only by an individual three-judge panel.43 The
Supreme Court resolved that question in 1941 in Textile Mills Securities
Corp. v. Commissioner,44 holding that, notwithstanding any ambiguity in
the statute authorizing three-judge panels, the federal appellate courts had
the inherent authority to convene and decide cases en banc. 45
Once the question of the federal appellate courts' power to convene en
banc was resolved, the question of procedure arose. The Supreme Court
did not address this issue in Textile Mills, presumably leaving the exercise
of en banc review to the individual circuits. 46  In 1948, Congress
incorporated the Textile Mills decision into the United States Code at 28
37. Guzmcin,419F.3dat31.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 28 (citing cases for the proposition that a federal circuit court sits en
bane to overrule a prior panel opinion).
40. For a detailed history of the development of en bane review, see A. Lamar
Alexander, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating
Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 565-74 (1965); see also
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1009-11 (setting out the history of the development of en
bane review).
41. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1009 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2,
26 Stat. 826, 826).
42. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 118, 36 Stat. 1131).
43. Compare Lang's Estate v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1938) (finding no
method of rehearing a case with more than three judges), with Comm'r v. Textile Mills Sec.
Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (determining that the court had the authority to sit
en bane), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
44. 314 U.S. 326.
45. Id. at 331-35.
46. Alexander, supra note 40, at 573.
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U.S.C. § 46.47 This section of the code provides for en banc review while
simultaneously affirming the primacy of the three-judge panel as the basic
decisional unit of the federal appellate courts:
(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its panels in such order and
at such times as the court directs.
(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and
determination of cases and controversies by separate panels, each
consisting of three judges ....
(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or
panel of not more than three judges (except that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three
judges if its rules so provide), unless a hearing or rehearing before the
court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit
who are in regular active service. A court in banc shall consist of all
circuit judges in regular active service .... 48
One thing that is clear, however, is that the statute merely codifies the
court's ruling.49 The determination that the courts have the power to
convene en banc, and the corresponding rules regarding stare decisis and
the law of the circuit, are rules made by the courts themselves, not by
legislative fiat.50
Procedures governing en banc review were addressed after Textile Mills.
In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.,51 the
Supreme Court established several fundamental procedural requirements
applicable to en banc review, including litigants' rights to suggest that the
court hear a case en banc. 52 Although the Court further noted that the
circuits should make their en banc procedures transparent to litigants, it left
control over the process with the circuits themselves. 53 Litigants, while
permitted to suggest en banc review, could not force the circuit judges'
hands.54
Procedures for en banc review appear in Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35 and local circuit rules. Rule 35 limits use of en banc review,
providing that "[a]n en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary
47. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
46 (1952)); see also Alexander, supra note 40, at 573 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 46
incorporated the rule from Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner); Ginsburg &
Falk, supra note 3, at 1011 & n.22 (same).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (2006).
49. Barrett, supra note 15, at 828 ("Courts do not purport to interpret any statutory or
constitutional text in the development of [horizontal] stare decisis doctrine.").
50. Id.
51. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
52. Id. at 268.
53. Id at 250.
54. Id. (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) "neither forbids nor requires each active
member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc").
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to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." 55
Although Rule 35 sets out two circumstances justifying en banc review,
it does not articulate with precision the types of cases meriting en banc
review. The "exceptional importance" standard is sufficiently broad so as
to encompass a wide range of cases. And as the language of the rule
suggests, although en banc review will "ordinarily" be granted only when
one of the criteria are met, a court could undertake en banc review in other
circumstances. The only circumstance in which courts say that en banc
review is required is to overrule circuit precedent pursuant to the law of the
circuit rule, and, as noted above, even that rule is subject to exceptions. 56
As a result, questions have arisen regarding the circumstances under which
en banc review is appropriate.
One circumstance not directly addressed by the criteria concerns whether
en banc review is appropriate when a decision creates intercircuit conflict.
A decision creating an intercircuit conflict can be considered a question of
exceptional importance because of the difficulties that inconsistencies
across circuits create.57 Questions of exceptional importance can also
55. FED. R. App. P. 35.
56. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
57. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1023. The Advisory Committee notes on the 1998
amendments to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 35 discuss this issue at length:
Intercircuit conflict is cited as one reason for asserting that a proceeding
involves a question of "exceptional importance." Intercircuit conflicts create
problems. When the circuits construe the same federal law differently, parties'
ights and duties depend upon where a case is litigated. Given the increase in the
number of cases decided by the federal courts and the limitation on the number of
cases the Supreme Court can hear, conflicts between the circuits may remain
unresolved by the Supreme Court for an extended period of time. The existence of
an intercircuit conflict often generates additional litigation in the other circuits as
well as in the circuits that are already in conflict. Although an en banc proceeding
will not necessarily prevent intercircuit conflicts, an en banc proceeding provides a
safeguard against unnecessary intercircuit conflicts.
Some circuits have had rules or internal operating procedures that recognize a
conflict with another circuit as a legitimate basis for granting a rehearing en banc.
An intercircuit conflict may present a question of "exceptional importance"
because of the costs that intercircuit conflicts impose on the system as a whole, in
addition to the significance of the issues involved. It is not, however, the
Committee's intent to make the granting of a hearing or rehearing en banc
mandatory whenever there is an intercircuit conflict.
The amendment states that "a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a
question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel
decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of every other United States
Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue." ... That language contemplates
two situations in which a rehearing en banc may be appropriate. The first is when
a panel decision creates a conflict. A panel decision creates a conflict when it
conflicts with the decisions of all other circuits that have considered the issue. If a
panel decision simply joins one side of an already existing conflict, a rehearing en
banc may not be as important because it cannot avoid the conflict. The second
situation that may be a strong candidate for a rehearing en banc is one in which the
circuit persists in a conflict created by a pre-existing decision of the same circuit
and no other circuits have joined on that side of the conflict.
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include questions of first impression in the circuit. An individual panel
clearly has the authority to decide a question of first impression. 58 From
time to time, however, the circuit may find it advisable to convene en banc
to resolve a question of first impression.
The indeterminacy of the criteria prompted Judge Douglas Ginsburg of
the District of Columbia Circuit to characterize them as expressing "more
of an attitude than a standard." 59 Another way of evaluating the criteria
justifying en banc review is to consider the purposes of such review:
increasing public confidence in the judiciary, which generally applies when
the case is exceptionally important to the public; improving judicial
administration, in which circumstance the case is exceptionally important to
the court; and correcting errors, including cases in which a panel makes an
error of law or considers itself bound by an erroneous precedent, which
generally involves a case that is exceptionally important to the parties. 60
Regardless of how the criteria are interpreted, it is important to remember
that Rule 35 is directed toward parties and their ability to petition for en
banc review. The decision to convene en banc lies solely in the judges'
discretion,61 and, in fact, most en banc review is generated sua sponte
within the court. 62 Any judge can call for a vote on en banc review. 63
Before a panel opinion is issued, a member of the panel can call for a
vote.64 After a panel opinion is issued, the call can come from any judge on
the court. 65
Of course, en banc activity is not the only way for a judge to influence
the outcome of a case. An "off-panel" judge may attempt to persuade the
panel to revise its opinion to address a concern. 66 But if the disagreement
cannot be resolved through informal back channels, the judge may initiate
FED. R. App. P. 35 advisory committee notes on the 1998 amendment.
58. Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions (Jan. 17, 1996),
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/intemet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20-
%20Irons%20Footnote/$FILE/IRONS.PDF [hereinafter Policy Statement].
59. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1022.
60. Id. at 1025-41.
61. As the Advisory Committee notes on the 1998 amendments to FRAP 35 explain,
Because of the discretionary nature of the en bane procedure, the filing of a
suggestion for rehearing en banc has not required a vote; a vote is taken only when
requested by a judge. It is not the Committee's intent to change the discretionary
nature of the procedure or to require a vote on a petition for rehearing en banc.
The rule continues, therefore, to provide that a court is not obligated to vote on
such petitions. It is necessary, however, that each court develop a procedure for
disposing of such petitions because they will suspend the finality of the court's
judgment and toll the time for filing a petition for certiorari.
FED. R. App. P. 35 advisory committee notes on the 1998 amendment.
62. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1012-13; Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 17, 19 (2002).
63. Wasby, supra note 62, at 19.
64. Id.
65. Id. Indeed, if the parties do not request rehearing en banc, they may be asked to
brief the issue of whether the case merits en bane review after a judge initiates en bane
activity, thereby reversing the typical order of activity in the case. Id. at 19-20.
66. Id at 20.
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the en banc call. 67 The call for en banc review is accompanied by a
memorandum explaining the basis for the call, and the judges vote on the
matter.68 A majority of the judges must vote in favor of en banc review for
the matter to proceed.69
Once the decision to hear or rehear a case en banc has been made, the
parties typically submit additional briefs.70 In most cases, the judges will
hear oral argument as well, although that is not always the case. 71 All of
the judges on the circuit convene together to hear argument and, as
necessary, conference regarding the case. 72
B. Informal En Banc Review
Informal en banc review is a procedure by which one federal circuit court
panel circulates an opinion to the full court for acquiescence in an action as
a substitute for formal en banc review. It is often used when en banc review
is possible, but is not required. For example, en banc review is not required
when a panel addresses a question of first impression, but the panel may
choose nevertheless to obtain the acquiescence of other members of the
court. En banc review may also not be appropriate when an opinion creates
or continues an intercircuit conflict. 73 A panel may, nevertheless, in this
circumstance wish to obtain the acquiescence of the rest of the court in the
opinion. On the other hand, sometimes informal en banc procedures are
used to overrule circuit precedent. Sometimes this occurs in cases that at
least arguably fall under an exception to the law of the circuit rule, but
sometimes it occurs when en banc review should, according to the law of
the circuit rule, be required.
In practice, what usually happens is that a panel circulates all or part of
an opinion to the full court with an explanation that the opinion takes an
action that would ordinarily require the court to convene en banc,
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. The determination of what constitutes a majority was handled on a circuit by circuit
basis for many years. See Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 805, 815-
16 (1993); see also FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee notes on the 2005 amendment.
The revision of FRAP 35 in 2005 resolved this question in favor of the so-called "case
majority" approach.
70. Wasby, supra note 62, at 21.
71. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BusINEss OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 46 tbl.S-1 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (showing fourteen en
bane cases decided without oral argument in 2007).
72. The exception is the Ninth Circuit, which by rule provides that en bane review is
conducted by eleven of the court's judges: the chiefjudge and ten additional judges selected
at random from among those eligible to participate in the en banc proceeding. 9TH CIR. R.
35-3. For a discussion of this limited en bane procedure, see Pamela Ann Rymer, The
"Limited" En Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 317 (2006).
73. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
essentially with an invitation to call for en banc review. 74 If a majority
agrees with the disposition or at least does not vote to hear or rehear the
case en banc, the panel opinion is issued with a notation to that effect. 75
Sometimes both the action and the notation indicating approval through
informal en banc review appear in the body of the opinion. 76 Sometimes
the action appears in the body of the opinion and the notation of informal en
banc approval appears in a footnote. 77 Sometimes both the action and the
notation of informal en banc approval appear in a footnote. 78
1. Circuits Using Informal En Banc Review and Frequency of Use
Not all circuits use informal en banc review. The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits do not authorize or use
it. Among the remaining nine circuits, the frequency of use varies
considerably. Four circuits have used informal en banc review sparingly.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used it once in 1991, and
that opinion was vacated when the court decided to rehear the case using
the formal en banc procedure. 79 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit used it once in 1975.80 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit used it three times between 1978 and 2007,81 and the U.S. Court of
74. See, e.g., Saban v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 509 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting
that the panel opinion, which overruled a prior panel opinion, was circulated to the full court
and no eligible judge voted for en banc review); United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting that a decision abandoning the holding in a prior panel decision was
circulated to all active members of the court); United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1105
n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that a circuit panel may overrule a decision of a prior panel with
the authorization of all active judges on the court); United States v. Southerland, 466 F.3d
1083, 1084 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the opinion had been circulated to and approved
by the full court pursuant to the circuit's informal en banc review procedure); Educadores
Puertorriquefios en Acci6n v. Hernndez, 367 F.3d 61, 67 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the
opinion was circulated to the active judges on the court and that none "interposed an
objection to the panel's overruling of prior circuit precedent"); Ginsburg & Falk, supra note
3, at 1015-16 (comparing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
informal en bane procedure, which requires approval of a majority of judges, with the
Seventh Circuit procedure, which allows a panel to overrule if a majority of judges do not
object).
75. See cases cited supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Saban, 509 F.3d at 379; Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 611 (7th
Cir. 2004); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union
Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2001).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 436 & n. 1 (7th Cir. 2007).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006); Zerilli-
Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Wilson, 169 F.3d 418, 427 n.9 (7th Cir. 1999).
79. Watts v. Burkhart, No. 89-6160, 1991 WL 261224 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1991), vacated
and reh 'g en banc granted, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
80. Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 715 n.3 (4th Cir. 1975).
81. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 779 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1990); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord (In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 612 F.2d 377, 378 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 n.4
(8th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 78
THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used it seven times between 1984 and 2007.82
In these circuits, informal en banc review is so unusual that the cases
invoking it are the exceptions that prove substantial adherence to the law of
the circuit rule. That is, although these courts recognize their authority to
modify the law of the circuit rule, they seem to do so rarely and only on an
ad hoc basis. The law of the circuit rule is strong in these circuits.
The use of informal en banc review is considerably more notable in the
remaining five circuits, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits. The First Circuit has
used it eighteen times from 1990 to 2007, the Second Circuit seventy-one
times from 1966 to 2007, the Seventh Circuit 272 times from 1969 to 2007,
the Tenth Circuit twenty-nine times from 1984 to 2007, and the District of
Columbia Circuit twenty-six times from 1977 to 2007. 83 Although the
number of times informal en banc review has been used may seem small in
relation to the court's entire docket, when compared with the number of en
82. Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338, 346 n.19 (5th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 943 n.* (5th Cir. 1993); Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d
1311, 1316 n.22 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 795 n.1 (5th Cir.
1989); Dombusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 612 n.l (5th Cir. 1988); Koonce v. Quaker
Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 706 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986); Affholder, Inc. v. S. Rock,
Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
83. See infra Appendix A for lists of cases by circuit. The figures reported here vary
considerably from those of the only other compilation of informal en banc cases. See Bennett
& Pembroke, supra note 3. That study, however, dates from 1986.
To find the informal en banc cases, I used "opinion /10 circulat!" as a word search in the
Westlaw database for each individual circuit (e.g., CTA1, CTA2, etc.). This is because
virtually all of the cases in which informal en banc review is used contain language saying
that the opinion was circulated to the full court. The search overall was too broad in that it
retrieved some number of cases that did not concern informal en banc procedures, such as
those involving circulation of publications or circulatory disorders. In the Seventh Circuit,
which has established its process by rule, I also searched by rule number. I also Shepardized
and KeyCited cases cited as authority for the procedure to find additional cases in which the
procedure was invoked. Finally, I searched by West key number. Under the topic Courts,
key number 90(2), cases discussing the scope of the law of the circuit rule are collected. I
reviewed all of these cases for any informal en banc cases. Notwithstanding these multiple
search techniques, it is possible that my research missed informal en banc cases in which no
language indicates that the opinion was circulated, in which the terms opinion and circulate
appeared more than ten words apart from each other, and which were not located by
alternative means. If anything, this search may undercount slightly the number of informal
en banc cases.
For the formal en banc cases, I used statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts. I aggregated those cases decided by the en banc court with additional
briefing and oral argument with those decided without additional briefing or oral argument
to compile the total number of cases considered in formal en banc proceedings. The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts compiles en banc statistics only as far back as
1970-1971. To locate earlier en banc cases for the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second
and Seventh Circuits, I searched for "in banc" or "en banc" with a date restriction. This
search was overinclusive in that it retrieved every case in which those terms appeared (such
as those citing en banc cases) as well as cases decided en banc. Nevertheless, because it is
possible that some en banc cases lack the term en banc and indicate en banc status only
through the list of judges hearing the case, this search may have failed to identify some en
banc cases decided before the Administrative Office began compiling statistics.
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banc dispositions, its use is, relatively speaking, significant. Figure 1 shows
the comparisons of the number of formal and informal en banc hearings
across circuits. 84
FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF FORMAL AND
INFORMAL EN BANC CASES
Date of First Number of Number ofInformal En Formal En BancBncmae E Banc Cases Cases During
Through 2007 That Time
1st 1990 18 38
2d 1966 71 52
4th 1975 1 286
5th 1984 7 267
6th 1991 1 73
7th 1969 272 196
8th 1978 3 249
10th 1984 29 176
D.C. 1977 26 113
2. The Development of Informal En Banc Procedures
Courts typically develop rules of stare decisis by judicial opinion. 85
Indeed, this has been characterized as one of the few areas of judicially
created federal common law.86 And there is no question that courts have
the authority to develop principles of stare decisis as part of their Article III
judicial power. Determining decisionmaking processes is integral to the
process of deciding cases on the merits and, thus, is within the courts'
province. 87
As the following analysis of the development of informal en banc
procedures shows, however, informal en banc review has developed in an
84. Appendix A lists informal en banc cases by circuit along with the total number
issued. Statistics on formal en banc opinions are available for 1997 through 2007 from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts by viewing Table S.I in each year's
Annual Report of the Director. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). The
Administrative Office's statistics for 1970-1996 are on file with the Fordham Law Review,
and those for earlier years were compiled manually as noted in note 83, supra.
85. Sloan, supra note 15, at 712-13.
86. Barrett, supra note 15, at 825.
87. Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 212-14 (2001); Gary Lawson, Mostly
Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REv. 1 (2007);
see also Sloan, supra note 15, at 713 (discussing the use of local procedural rules to
authorize nonprecedential opinions).
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ad hoc, idiosyncratic way in most circuits with little or no justification. The
District of Columbia Circuit has promulgated a policy governing use of
informal en banc procedures,88 and the Seventh Circuit authorizes the
procedure by local rule. 89 Otherwise, aside from occasional nods to the law
of the circuit rule, the remaining circuits do not attempt in any meaningful
way to justify the use of informal en banc procedures or to define with
clarity when the use of the procedures is appropriate. Typically, at some
point a panel says it can, when circumstances require, overrule a prior panel
opinion without resort to the en banc procedure. Then later cases cite back
to the original case as authority. But no statute or Supreme Court authority
authorizes it, and few of the cases that employ the procedure analyze the
reasons or basis for departing from the law of the circuit rule. Presumably,
in the absence of direction to the contrary, the same criteria justifying
formal en banc review (intracircuit conflict or a question of exceptional
importance, including as appropriate, decisions creating or continuing
intercircuit conflict) would also justify informal review. But this is not
explained in the opinions invoking informal en banc procedures.
A review of the development of informal en banc procedures for each
circuit that uses them follows. Because the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits have used informal en banc procedures so rarely90 (and in the Sixth
Circuit the opinion was later withdrawn when the case was reheard en
banc),9 1 they cannot truly be said to have developed informal en banc
procedures; therefore, they are not discussed here.
In the First Circuit, the development of the procedure is fairly clear, and
the court provides some limited justification for the creation of the
procedure. Although the First Circuit has used informal en banc procedures
since 1990,92 the procedure did not firmly take root until 1992, when the
court decided Gallagher v. Wilton Enterprises, Inc.,93 and Trailer Marine
Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez.94 Although these are not the only cases
cited in support of the procedure, they are cited frequently95 and contain
88. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
90. See supra p. 728, fig. 1.
91. Watts v. Burkhart, No. 89-6160, 1991 WL 261224 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1991), vacated
and reh 'g en banc granted, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
92. United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990).
93. 962 F.2d 120 (1st Cir. 1992).
94. 977 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
95. As of 2007, twelve cases cited one or both of the opinions as authority for informal
en banc review: Educadores Puertorriquefios en Acci6n v. Hemindez, 367 F.3d 61, 67 n.2
(1st Cir. 2004); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004); Carpenters Local
Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 138 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000); Hollingsworth
& Vose Co. v. A-P-A Transp. Corp., 158 F.3d 617, 620 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998); Grant-Chase v.
Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 431, 435 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998); Kelley v. Airborne
Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 357 n.15 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d
695, 697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 187 n.3
(1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 629 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996); N.L.R.B. v.
Hosp. San Rafael, Inc., 42 F.3d 45, 51 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994); Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 591
n.7 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993).
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explanations of the procedure, unlike some other cases. Thus, they seem to
have become the foundation for the use of the procedure in the First Circuit.
Gallagher justifies the use of informal en banc review under limited
circumstances:
Because this case required us to reexamine [an earlier circuit
precedent], we would ordinarily have convened the en banc court. We
have, however, in rare instances, where it has become reasonably clear
that a prior precedent of this court was erroneously decided or is no longer
good law, achieved the same result more informally by circulating the
proposed panel opinion to all the active judges of the court for pre-
publication comment. See[,] e.g., United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d
593, 598 n.9 (1st Cir. 1990). While this practice is to be used sparingly
and with extreme caution, we have employed it in the special
circumstances of this case, with the result that the entire court has
approved the overruling of [the earlier circuit precedent] on the point at
issue.96
Bucuvalas, however, does not explain or justify the procedure; it simply
notes that, because it overrules a prior case, it was circulated to the full
court.97 Thus, Bucuvalas is simply an example of the procedure, not a
justification of it.
Trailer Marine refers back to Gallagher for the procedure, but its
footnote contains language that then became the template for future cases:
Following the procedure described in Gallagher v. Wilton Enterprises,
Inc ... the proposed panel opinion in this case was circulated to all
active judges of the court prior to publication, and none posed an
objection to the panel's treatment of [an earlier case]. This procedure,
needless to say, does not convert this opinion into an en banc decision nor
preclude a suggestion of rehearing en banc on any issue in the case,
whether or not related to the panel's treatment of [the earlier case]. 98
The Second Circuit's first informal en banc cases appear to have been
decided in 1966. 99 The procedure was used again once in 1972100 and once
in 1975,101 but it did not firmly take root until 1979. In that year alone, the
procedure was used three times, 102 and it has been used regularly since
then. 10 3 Although some opinions cite earlier opinions in invoking the
procedure, many do not, and there does not appear to be any single case or
96. 962 F.2d at 124 n.4.
97. 909 F.2d at 598 n.9.
98. 977 F.2d at 9 n.5. (citing Gallagher, 962 F.2d at 124 n.4).
99. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Malafronte,
357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966). The two cases were companion appeals.
100. United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. In re Phillips, 510 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1975).
102. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Grimes v. United States, 607
F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1979); Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 592 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1979).
103. See supra p. 728, fig.1.
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series of cases establishing the procedure or its acceptable uses. 104 Many of
the opinions simply state that the opinion has been circulated to all active
members of the court. 10 5 Some also note that no judge sought en banc
consideration. 10 6 The statement in United States v. Brutus10 7 provides the
most thorough explanation of informal en banc review that the Second
Circuit has provided:
We recognize that the law of the circuit doctrine dictates that we are
"bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are
overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme
Court." We have therefore circulated this opinion to all active members of
this court before filing. 10 8
This nod to the law of the circuit rule is virtually the only reference to the
requirements of horizontal stare decisis in any of the Second Circuit's
informal en banc cases. Interestingly, the court simultaneously invokes the
law of the circuit rule and implicitly deems the informal circulation of its
opinion as the functional equivalent of en banc review.
The Fifth Circuit's approach is similar to the Second Circuit's. It first
used an informal en banc procedure in 1984 in AfJholder, Inc. v. Southern
Rock, Inc.109 The court stated that changes in the law undermined the
holdings of two prior Fifth Circuit opinions, giving the panel the authority
to overrule them:
Mindful of the law of the circuit rule, which forbids one panel to overrule
another save when a later statute or Supreme Court decision has changed
the applicable law, this opinion has been considered not only by all
members of the panels in those two cases but also by all judges in active
service who were not members of those two panels. By unanimous
104. For example, United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007), cites
United States v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 111, 132 n. 18 (2d Cir. 2005), and United States v.
Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 103 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004), without explanation upon invoking the
procedure. Gonzales, in turn, cites Mincey and United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 105
n.1 (2d Cir. 2005), to invoke the procedure, again without explanation. Crosby cites no
authority for the procedure. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 105 n. 1. Mincey cites Tesser v. Board of
Education, 370 F.3d 314, 320 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004), andAdeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144,
155 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004), with no explanation. Tesser also cites Adeleke, among other cases,
Tesser, 370 F.3d at 320 n.3, and so on. The trail of unexplained citations leads back to other
unexplained citations, but nowhere is any justification for or explanation of the purpose of
informal en banc review provided.
105. See, e.g., Crosby, 397 F.3d at 105 n.1; United States v. Walker, 353 F.3d 130, 134
n.2 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, Nnebe v. United States, 534 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2008); New Pac. Overseas Group (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Excal Int'l Dev. Corp., 252 F.3d 667, 670
n.1 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 338 n.15 (2d Cir. 1999).
106. See, e.g., Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 n.7 (2d Cir.
2003).
107. 505 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2007).
108. Id. at 87 n.5 (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004))
(additional citations omitted).
109. 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984).
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agreement the court has sua sponte reconsidered those two opinions,
authorized their overruling, and chosen to adhere to this opinion. ' 1 0
Later opinions also reference the law of the circuit rule while
simultaneously disregarding it, effectively treating informal circulation of
an opinion as equivalent to formal en banc review. II Later opinions that
create intercircuit conflict, rather than rejecting prior circuit precedent, also
note a policy of circulating opinions in that circumstance. 1 2
In the Seventh Circuit, the earliest use of informal en banc review
appears to have been in 1969.113 Initially, panels circulated opinions to the
active judges on the court in lieu of formal en banc review without any
reference to authority or explanation of the procedure. 114 In 1976, the court
promulgated Local Rule 16(e), 115 which provided as follows:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict
between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them
do not vote to rehear in banc the issue of whether the position should be
adopted. In the discretion of the panel, a proposed opinion which would
establish a new rule or procedure may be similarly circulated before it is
issued. When the position is adopted by the panel after compliance with
this procedure, the opinion, when published, shall contain a footnote
worded, depending on the circumstances, in substance as follows:
This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court in
regular active service. (No judge favored, or A majority did not
110. Id. at 311.
111. See, e.g., Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 612 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing
that one panel cannot overrule another, formally circulating the opinion with a notation
regarding the panel's proposed departure from prior circuit precedent, and deeming lack of
objection or request for en banc review as authorization to depart from the prior opinion);
Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 706 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing that one panel cannot overrule another even on questions of state law in
diversity cases but treating lack of objection or request for rehearing en banc as authorization
to depart from a prior opinion).
112. See, e.g., Milofsky v Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338, 346 n.19 (5th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 943 n.* (5th Cir. 1993); Estate of Farrar v.
Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1316 n.22 (5th Cir. 1991). The source of this policy is not clear. The
only reference in the Fifth Circuit's Local Rules and Internal Operating Procedures to
policies relating to conflicts with prior circuit precedent concerns description of the bases for
en banc review, 5TH CIR. R. 35, and criteria for publication of opinions, 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.
113. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 934 n.5 (7th Cir. 1969).
114. See, e.g., Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 932 n.1 1(7th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Nordlof, 440 F.2d 840, 845 n.10 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated, 454 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.
1971) (relying on intervening Supreme Court authority); Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. United
Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
115. It is unclear exactly when the rule was promulgated. The first reference to it in an
opinion was in 1977. Zeigler Coal Co. v. Local Union No. 1870, 566 F.2d 582, 585 n.** (7th
Cir. 1977). A copy of the local circuit rules containing rules effective July 1, 1976, includes
rule 16(e). PRACTITIONER'S HXNDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRcUIT 127 (1981 ed.) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
Thus, it appears that the rule was promulgated sometime in 1976.
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favor) a rehearing in banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v.
Roe.) 116
In 1987, the rule was renumbered as Rule 40(f), but with no change in its
language. 17 In 1996, the rule was renumbered again as Rule 40(e). 118 The
language is identical to earlier versions of the rule, except that rehearings
before the full court are referred to as "en banc" rather than "in banc."' 19
Cases employing the procedure do not explain or justify it; they simply
contain a version of the footnote required by local rule along with a citation
to the relevant rule.120 The Seventh Circuit has, however, expressed a fairly
relaxed view of the principle of horizontal stare decisis, saying in essence
that it must seriously consider any colorable argument to overturn prior
precedent. 121  Although this is not necessarily inconsistent with the
requirement that overruling requires formal en banc review, it does perhaps
evidence a philosophy of greater willingness to reconsider prior precedent
than in other circuits. It is interesting to note, however, that a number of
informal en banc cases have occurred despite split votes on whether to hear
the case en banc, 122 including some cases with published dissents from
denials of en banc review.' 23
116. 7TH CIR. R. 16(e), in PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 115, at 127.
117. 7TH CIR. R. 40(f), in PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 126 (1987 ed.) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
118. Historical research into local circuit rules is difficult because earlier versions are
rarely archived. The current version of the rule appears in Seventh Circuit Local Rule 40(e).
Cases began referring to Rule 40(e) instead of Rule 40(f) in 1996. See, e.g., Hogan v.
McBride, 74 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the renumbering apparently occurred in
1996.
119. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). One interesting aspect of this rule is its placement within the local
rules. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 and 7th Circuit Local Rule 40 both concern
panel rehearings, not rehearing en banc. It seems unusual that a provision authorizing
informal en banc review to overrule prior precedent would be included with a rule on panel
rehearing instead of being included with 7th Circuit Local Rule 35, governing en banc
review.
120. See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 n.7 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097
(2005); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000).
121. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that
a court is "not absolutely bound by [its own prior decisions], and must give fair
consideration to any substantial argument that a litigant makes for overruling a previous
decision").
122. See, e.g., Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659, 661 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007) (four judges voted
to rehear the case en banc); Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2004) (three
judges voted to rehear the case en banc); Smith v. Office of Civilian Health & Med. Program
of Uniformed Health Servs., 97 F.3d 950, 950 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) (four judges voted to
rehear the case en banc); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 640 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., Posner, C.J.,
& Manion, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d
437, 448 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., joined by Posner, C.J., & Manion, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc), overruled by Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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The earliest Tenth Circuit case to employ an informal en banc procedure
was decided in 1984.124 In that and subsequent cases, the court notes that
the opinion was circulated because it overrules prior decisions and that all
or a majority of the judges agreed with the disposition on the particular
question of law. 125 The procedure has not been explained in detail by the
Tenth Circuit, although United States v. Atencio126 provides minimal
discussion of the procedure:
A panel decision may overrule a point of law established by a prior
panel through an en banc footnote by obtaining authorization from all
active judges on the court .... This opinion has been circulated to all
active members of this court, and it is our unanimous decision to overturn
the point of law articulated in [an earlier case] that a defendant does not
forfeit his right to appeal by failing to object to [a particular type of] error
at sentencing .... For these reasons, the en banc court now overrules [the
earlier case] and holds that parties must object to [the] error at the time of
sentencing. 127
This explanation is interesting for two reasons. First, the court cites United
States v. Meyers12 8 to support the use of informal en banc review, which is
interesting because Meyers is only an example of a case invoking informal
en banc review. Meyers does not explain or justify the procedure. 129 This
is yet another example of the trail of citations like those in the First Circuit
cases that lead to nowhere. 130 Second, the Atencio opinion characterizes its
overruling of the earlier case as the action of the en banc court even though
Atencio is a panel decision and the overruling was done without true en
banc review.
The District of Columbia Circuit first used the informal en banc
procedure in 1977 in United States v. Sheppard.131 Informal en banc
review was not formalized, however, until 1981. In Irons v. Diamond,132
the court ruled in a long-standing and much-litigated dispute over a
Freedom of Information Act request to obtain records relating to granted
patent applications. The case had bounced up and down between the
124. EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1984).
125. United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127, 1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006); Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1414 n.8 (10th Cir. 1990); Gaddis, 733 F.2d at 1377 n.3.
126. 476 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007).
127. Id. at 1105 n.6 (citing United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 721 n.3 (10th Cir.
2000)).
128. 200 F.3d 715.
129. United States v. Meyers says only this about its use of informal en banc review:
"This opinion has been circulated to all active members of this court, and it is their
unanimous decision to overturn the following point of law articulated in" two prior cases.
Id. at 716 n.3.
130. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
131. 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977). That decision announced a new evidentiary standard
in rape cases. It simply included a general notation that the opinion rejected the evidentiary
standard applied in some earlier, unspecified opinions and was, therefore, circulated to full
court, which voted unanimously against en banc review. Id. at 119 n. 18.
132. 670 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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district court and the District of Columbia Circuit several times. 133 In prior
decisions, denominated Irons II and Dann, the court reached inconsistent
decisions regarding the application of 35 U.S.C. § 122. The government
sought to distinguish Irons II from Dann, but the court thought that the
proffered distinctions were not persuasive and elected to address the
conflict between the two cases directly. 134 The court then rejected the
interpretation of the statute in Irons 11 and adopted the interpretation from
Dann.135 In so doing, the court dropped a footnote with the following
language: "The foregoing part of the division's decision, because it
resolves an apparent conflict between two prior decisions, has been
separately considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes
the law of the circuit. '136
After that case, the court began using "so-called Irons footnote[s]" in
cases that would otherwise ordinarily have required en banc review. 137
Fifteen years later, the District of Columbia Circuit promulgated a "Policy
Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions," dated January 17,
1996. Prior to January 2008, this policy was an internal court document
that was unavailable to the public, although it was cited and extensively
quoted in a published opinion in 1999.138 Beginning in January 2008, the
court made the document public. 139  The policy first expressly
acknowledges that the procedure is a substitute for formal en banc review to
be used when "action by the court en banc may be called for, but the
circumstances of the case or the importance of the legal questions presented
do not warrant the heavy administrative burdens of full en banc hearing." 140
It then goes on say that use of the procedure is appropriate when the court is
(1) resolving an apparent conflict in the prior decisions of panels of the
court;
(2) rejecting a prior statement of law which, although arguably dictum,
warrants express rejection to avoid future confusion;
(3) overruling an old or obsolete decision which, although still technically
valid as precedent, has plainly been rendered obsolete by subsequent
legislation or other developments; and
133. Id. at 266-67.
134. Id. at 267-68.
135. Id. at 268.
136. Id. at268n.ll.
137. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1015-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. In re Sealed Case, 181 F.3d 128, 143-44, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Henderson, J.,
concurring).
139. Letter from Mark J. Langer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, to author (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The Policy
Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions is now posted on the court's website.
Policy Statement, supra note 58.
140. Policy Statement, supra note 58, at 1.
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(4) overruling a more recent precedent which, due to an intervening
Supreme Court decision, or the combined weight of authority from other
circuits, a panel is convinced is clearly an incorrect statement of current
law. 14 1
The District of Columbia Circuit is the only circuit to come right out and
say that it uses the informal procedure when the case technically requires
action by the en banc court but that the case is "just not important enough"
to justify the effort. 142
3. Uses of Informal En Banc Review
Although the courts themselves (other than the District of Columbia
Circuit) do not clearly specify when the use of informal en banc procedures
is justified, an analysis of the cases in which it has been invoked reveals six
circumstances under which it is typically used: (1) when the opinion
creates or continues an intercircuit conflict; (2) when the opinion expressly
overrules a prior panel precedent that has been rendered invalid by
intervening authority (a U.S. Supreme Court opinion; an en banc opinion by
the circuit; a federal statute or regulation; or a change to state law when the
state's law provides the rule of decision); (3) when the opinion resolves an
intracircuit conflict or ambiguity without expressly overruling prior cases,
including cases in which a rule of law is modified or prior precedent is
limited or rejected without being formally overruled; (4) when the opinion
addresses a question of first impression or states a rule or policy where none
existed before; (5) when the opinion expressly overrules prior panel
precedent that has not otherwise been rendered invalid; and (6) when the
case has some other unusual aspect to it, such as an unusual procedural
history. 143 In terms of subject matter, the courts use informal en banc
procedures slightly more often in civil cases than in criminal cases, with
criminal cases constituting roughly forty-one percent of informal en banc
cases and civil cases accounting for roughly fifty-nine percent.1 44 For
purposes of this calculation, criminal cases are defined broadly to include
direct appeals, habeas corpus petitions, and challenges to prison conditions.
The charts below show the breakdown by circuit of the nature of the
informal en banc caseload. 145 The categorization of the cases is not without
qualification. Sometimes it was hard to tell exactly why the court
undertook informal en banc review. 146 In other cases, the court took
141. Id.
142. Wald, supra note 31, at 486 n.30.
143. See infra p. 738, fig.2 and Appendix A.
144. See infra Appendix A. Criminal cases are identified by asterisk. Of a total of 428
informal en banc cases (including one each from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits), 174 (40.65%) were criminal and 254 (59.35%) were civil.
145. For a list of cases by circuit with their individual categorizations, see Appendix A,
infra.
146. See, e.g., Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787, 788 n.l (7th Cir. 1985) (noting
that the opinion was circulated pursuant to the local rules without explaining why);
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multiple actions, such as overruling panel precedent and creating an
intercircuit conflict on another issue. 147 In those cases, I had to choose a
category for the opinion; I did not count any opinion more than once. And
in still other cases, the court's language was ambiguous. If the court
"rejects" or "abrogates" a prior opinion that is in conflict with other circuit
precedent, is it resolving an intracircuit conflict without overruling any
case, or is it necessarily overruling a panel precedent even if it does not say
so expressly? 148 This required some judgment calls, using the context of
the case, the Shepard's and KeyCite treatment of the earlier opinion, and
later cases' characterization of the action. There is room for disagreement
with some of the judgments I made, 14 9 but even with some disagreement at
the margins, the statistics below provide an interesting snapshot of the ways
the federal appellate courts use informal en banc procedures.
Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 638 n.b (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that the
opinion was circulated pursuant to the local rules without explaining why). Most often,
these cases were categorized as resolving a question not previously addressed in the circuit
because, although not specifically stated in the opinion, that is what they appeared to do.
147. See, e.g., Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998) (overruling three panel
opinions on one issue, overruling a fourth panel opinion on a second issue, overruling a fifth
panel opinion that had been undermined by later Supreme Court authority, and creating
intercircuit conflicts with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits);
Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 402 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the
opinion both overruled prior circuit precedent and created a conflict with the Ninth Circuit).
These cases are categorized as overruling prior panel precedent.
148. For examples compare the following cases. In United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893
(7th Cir. 1994), the court states that it "depart[s] from" a portion of an earlier ruling. Id. at
907 n. 12. Reading the case and reviewing later treatment, it is clear that the earlier case was
effectively overruled, so Canoy is categorized as an overruling opinion. By contrast, in
Cement Division, National Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 31 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1994),
the court "depart[s] from" a portion of an earlier case. Id. at 586. Reading that case and
looking at later treatment, it is clear that the earlier case is still valid and that its language
was merely clarified in this opinion. Thus, Cement Division is categorized as resolving a
conflict or ambiguity. In Pence v. Rosenquist, 573 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1978), the majority
states that it is "withdrawing the categorical holding" of a prior case, in part in light of later
Supreme Court precedent, id at 400 n.8, while the dissent characterizes the majority's
opinion as a "retreat from" the prior case. Id. at 400 (Pell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Is the earlier decision overruled in part or simply clarified? I
characterized the opinion as overruling a case invalidated by intervening authority.
149. Two general decisions I made about categorizing cases are worth noting. One
concerns cases challenging criminal sentences imposed under the federal sentencing
guidelines after the Supreme Court determined that the guidelines were advisory rather than
mandatory in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The federal appellate courts
have had to decide a number of cases in which a defendant failed to challenge the sentencing
guidelines, was sentenced pursuant to the guidelines, and then appealed the sentence post-
Booker on the ground that failure to challenge the guidelines was plain error. See, e.g.,
United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2005). This small subset of cases does not
always fit neatly into the six categories articulated above, but most are characterized as
presenting a question of first impression because of the unique circumstances of each case.
Additionally, cases involving the appellate courts' supervisory authority over district courts
and attorneys practicing before the federal courts are generally treated as addressing
questions of first impression because they state rules or policies where none existed before.
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FIGURE 2: NATURE OF INFORMAL EN BANC CASES BY CIRCUIT
First Circuit-Of the 18 informal en banc cases, 7 were criminal,
and II were civil.
Total informal en bane decisions, 1990-2007 18
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 0
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or policy 2
where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 3
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 5
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent in force (0) 7
Miscellaneous (M) I
Total formal en bane cases, 1990-2007 38
Second Circuit-Of the 71 informal en banc cases, 35 were criminal,
and 36 were civil.
Total informal en bane decisions, i966-2007 71
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 0
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or policy 19
where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 19
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 16
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent in force (0) 13
Miscellaneous (M) 4
Total formal en bane cases, 1966-2007 52
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Fifth Circuit-Of the 7 informal en banc cases, 2 were criminal,
and 5 were civil.
Total informal en bane decisions, 1984-2007 7
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 3
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or policy 0
where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 1
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 0
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent in force (0) 3
Miscellaneous (M) 0
Total formal en bane cases, 1984-2007 267
Seventh Circuit 5 0 -Of the 272 informal en banc cases, 105 were criminal,
and 167 were civil.
Total informal en bane decisions, 1969-2007 272
Creating or continuing an intercircuit conflict (I) 99
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or 42
policy where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 27
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 24
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent in force (0) 73
Miscellaneous (M) 7
Total formal en bane cases, 1969-2007 196
150. Because the Seventh Circuit has used informal en banc review more often than all
other circuits combined, the sheer number of opinions means that many of the examples
cited throughout this Article come from that circuit. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit's extensive
use of informal en banc review provides a case study in both the advantages and
disadvantages of regular use of the procedure.
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Eighth Circuit-Of the 3 informal en banc cases, 1 was criminal,
and 2 were civil.
[Total formal en banc cases, 1978-2007 249
Tenth Circuit-Of the 29 informal en banc cases, 16 were criminal,
and 13 were civil.
Total informal en banc decisions, 1984-2007 29
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 0
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or 0
policy where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 3
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 6
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent (0) 19
Miscellaneous (M) I
Total formal en banc cases, 1984-2007 176
Total informal en banc decisions, 1978-2007
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 0
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or policy 0
where none existed before (Q)
Resolving an intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a 0
rule without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior
panel precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 0
authority (U)
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District of Columbia Circuit-Of the 26 informal en banc cases, 7 were
criminal, and 19 were civil.
Total informal en banc decisions, 1977-2007 26
Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict (I) 0
Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or 0
policy where none existed before (Q)
Resolving intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a rule 13
without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior panel
precedent without overruling it) (C)
Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior 6
authority (U)
Overruling panel precedent (0) 7
Miscellaneous (M) 0
Total formal en banc cases, 1977-2007 113
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INFORMAL
EN BANC PROCEDURES
A. Advantages
The primary advantage of informal en banc procedures is that they bring
the full court's attention to a greater number of cases than would be
possible if the court were restricted to formal en banc review. This results
in greater intracircuit consistency, improved efficiency, and greater
collegiality within the court.
Consider the alternative. In a significant percentage of cases in which the
courts elect to use informal en banc procedures, the panel could avoid en
banc review altogether. In resolving a question of first impression or
creating an intercircuit conflict, a panel can, unless it considers the question
one of exceptional importance, rule without any form of en banc review. 151
Taking the extra step of circulating the decision to the full court and
obtaining the acquiescence of at least a majority of the other judges helps
maintain intracircuit consistency: by getting most or all members of the
court on board from the start, the chances of a later, conflicting panel
opinion are reduced. 152
151. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (setting out criteria for en banc review).
152. For example, the Second Circuit used informal en banc review in United States v.
Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991), although a footnote indicating that the opinion was
circulated to the full court did not explain why. Id. at 414 n. 1 United States v. Novod, 923
F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1991), explains that Schwartz and Novod were both circulated to the full
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In cases involving conflicts among circuit authorities, panels could also
avoid en bane review in many circumstances by making nitpicky
distinctions among cases, aggressively characterizing statements in prior
opinions as dicta,153 ignoring inconsistent authority, 154 or rejecting or
disregarding such authority without expressly overruling it. These actions,
while expedient, create disarray within the circuit and leave future panels
with the option of doing the same or seeking en bane review to straighten
out the law. Outdated cases that have been effectively undermined by later
authorities but have not been formally overruled, as well as outlier cases
that are contrary to other circuit precedents, become "'derelicts on the
waters of the law" ' 155 if left unaddressed. By using informal en bane
review, the appellate courts can promote intracircuit consistency 156 and
efficiency. 157 Informal en bane review provides a way for appellate courts
court on the question of the proper interpretation of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
Id. at 973. The opinion goes on to explain that two of the three judges in Novod disagreed
with Schwartz but felt bound to follow it based on the outcome of the informal en banc
review. Id.
153. See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 23-24 (2002)
(discussing the potential for judges to use finespun distinctions and aggressive claims of
dictum to avoid following prior nonprecedential opinions). Indeed, even in the context of
informal en banc review, courts have made questionable characterizations of overruled
statements in prior opinions as dictum. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1016 (noting that a
statement that determined the outcome of a prior case was characterized as "a 'passing and
conclusory remark"' by the informal en banc opinion that overruled the prior case (quoting
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 16 & n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
154. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the
Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 942-48 (1991) (discussing Ninth Circuit cases
that failed to cite contrary precedent).
155. Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 590 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 357 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
156. See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541, 582-84 (1989).
157. Some informal en banc opinions addressed circuit conflicts directly instead of trying
to finesse the language. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 499 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
2007) (overruling an outlier case, United States v. Bessesen, 445 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1971));
Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 543-43 (7th Cir. 2006) (not overruling
any case, but clarifying language from prior opinions that was a source of confusion);
Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338, 346 n.19 (5th Cir. 2005) (circulating an
opinion that created a conflict with the Sixth Circuit); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,
204 F.3d 343, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting dictum from Schoenberg v. Shapolsky
Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992), in favor of the earlier test for jurisdiction in
federal copyright claims, as stated in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 338 F.2d 823 (2d. Cir.
1964)); Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 302 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1999) (circulating the opinion
because the holding may be inconsistent with circuit dicta); In re Flannery, 186 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 1999) (adopting a new policy regarding sanctions for attorney misconduct);
Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. A-P-A Transp. Corp., 158 F.3d 617, 620 (1st Cir. 1998)
("[W]e think it better candidly to disavow the reasoning" of a prior opinion instead of
relying on a contrary opinion that was distinguishable from the prior opinion); United States
v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 366, 372 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a prior decision to the contrary
was not controlling because the statement was dictum and treating resolution of the case as
one of first impression); United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 629 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996)
(circulating an opinion for informal en banc review even though an earlier en banc opinion
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to address circuit conflicts and eliminate outdated authority that has been
gradually eroded, even if facially still valid, without resort to formal en
banc review. 158
Consider also the time and effort involved in en banc review. Convening
en banc consumes significant judicial resources. Given the caseloads of the
federal appellate courts, dealing with outdated precedent or precedent
undermined by later authority with an informal en banc process is more
efficient than full en banc consideration. Parties are often called upon to
provide additional briefing and present second oral arguments, which adds
to the expense and hassle of litigation. The amount of time it takes to
convene all of the circuit judges together, hear the case, assign authorship,
and involve the judges in the drafting and review processes can be
significant, which adds to delay in resolving cases. 159
Informal en banc review can also encourage collegiality within the
circuit. Judges say that collegiality is vital for the efficient operation of the
court. 160 Most formal en banc rehearings are initiated sua sponte, not in
response to party motions. 161 Calls for formal en banc review can create
tensions among the judges. 162 Respect for the panel and the presumption of
finality require limits on formal en banc review. 163 Using informal review
procedures allows judges who are not on the panel to raise concerns or
suggest changes in language to a panel's opinion without having to invoke
had effectively undermined the panel opinion whose status was at issue); Bohn v. Park City
Group, Inc., 94 F.3d 1457, 1460 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (circulating an opinion that overruled a
case decided in 1953 that had been overruled sub silentio by a later en banc opinion); Lester
v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the panel chooses to
overrule a prior panel opinion "rather than attempt to distinguish and isolate [the earlier
panel opinion] (and engender the confusion that results from having two inconsistent
standards govern the same claims)"); Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the government's attempt to distinguish two inconsistent cases and resolving the
conflict directly); Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 592 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1979)
(overruling an outlier case from 1944 inconsistent with later circuit precedent).
158. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 3, at 558 (explaining that informal en banc review
is efficient because it resolves an issue in a single opinion and focuses the court's attention
on that issue); Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1043 (justifying the use of informal en banc
review on efficiency grounds); Wald, supra note 31, at 486 n.30 (noting that informal en
banc review is reserved for efficient overruling of precedents that are obsolete or unpopular).
159. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1018-22 (detailing the costs and other burdens
associated with formal en banc review); see also Wald, supra note 31, at 482-83.
160. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1016-18 ("Harmonious circuit life.. . depends
upon a high degree of mutual trust among the judges, and preferably a healthy respect for
each other's intelligence."); id at 1013 ("The court, like any team, functions best when each
member feels responsible to each of the others, and responsible for the performance of the
whole."); Wald, supra note 31, at 488. See generally Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word:
On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585 (1995).
161. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
162. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 3, at 543; Wald, supra note 31, at 488.
163. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1021. Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Donald
Falk also argue that too little en banc review threatens collegiality by creating the prospect of
rogue panels subject only to weak, informal sanctions for deterrence. Id.
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the formal en banc procedure and make more work for everyone on the
court or create discord on the court.
Also, interestingly, informal en banc review could provide at least a
partial solution to the problem of nonprecedential opinions. A major
argument judges have made against making nonprecedential opinions
binding is that it would take years of en banc work to undo what may be
wrong opinions. 164 If the opinions could be undone with informal en banc
review, however, this argument loses some of its force, and the idea of
giving nonprecedential opinions at least some precedential force becomes
possible. 165
B. Disadvantages
Although the use of informal en banc review as a substitute for formal en
banc review has some advantages, it also creates several problems. The
primary problem is the absence of standards governing use of informal en
banc review to overturn circuit precedent. Without at least some general
notion of the appropriate application of the procedure, it becomes
impossible to tell which cases are subject to the law of the circuit rule and
which are not. This causes the use of informal procedures to become
arbitrary, if not in actuality then in appearance, undermining the principle of
horizontal stare decisis.166 Other problems include use of footnotes to hide
the law, 167 potential negative effects on traditionally marginalized
groups, 168 diminished collegiality on the court, 169 lack of meaningful
opportunity for parties to participate in the process, 170 uncertainty about the
164. Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm UndDrang over the
Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1483-84 (2005); Amy E.
Sloan, If You Can 't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential
Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REv. 895, 937 (2008). Schiltz
describes judicial concerns about uses of nonprecedential opinions in the context of
opposition to FRAP 32.1, which eliminated citation restrictions on nonprecedential opinions:
Several judges who oppose Rule 32.1 have told me privately that what really
concerns them is not that unpublished opinions will be cited, but that courts will
eventually be forced to treat unpublished opinions as precedential. The courts of
appeals have issued hundreds of thousands of unpublished opinions, and judges
have no idea what is in them.... Judges are terrified that they will wake up one
day and find themselves bound by this mountain of unpublished opinions.
Schiltz, supra, at 1483. Requiring courts to use the en banc procedure to correct every
mistake in nonprecedential opinions issued over the years would create decades of work. Id.
at 1484.
165. See Sloan, supra note 164, at 930 (proposing giving nonprecedential opinions an
intermediate "overrulable" status).
166. See infra Part 1II.B.1.
167. See infra Part III.B.2.
168. See infra Part III.B.3.
169. See infra Part III.B.4.
170. See infra Part III.B.5.
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weight of informal en banc opinions, 171 and full court endorsement of
opinions based on less than thorough review. 172
1. Lack of Standards
With the exception of the District of Columbia Circuit, none of the
federal circuits that use informal en banc procedures have articulated
specific guidelines governing the procedures' application. 173 The federal
appellate courts have considerable discretion in determining when to
conduct formal en banc review, and whether a particular case is one of
"exceptional importance" can be in the eye of the beholder.174
Nevertheless, the courts have used informal en banc review in cases that
seem like they should fall in the exceptional importance category. Further,
all circuits agree that, with limited exceptions, formal en banc review is
necessary to overrule prior circuit precedent. 175 Yet even in this context, it
is simply unclear when a case merits formal en banc review and when one
merits informal en banc review. A review of cases reveals little rhyme or
reason for the use of informal en banc review. Informal en banc review has
been used to overrule both long-standing 176 and recent1 77 precedent, lines of
precedent 178 and individual cases, 179 and questions of constitutional, 180
171. See infra Part III.B.6.
172. See infra Part I.B.7.
173. See supra Part lI.B. Although the Seventh Circuit's local rules says its informal en
banc procedure is to be used to overrule panel opinions, it does not differentiate among the
types of circumstances justifying overruling the way the District of Columbia Circuit's
policy statement does. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). General statements, like those from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit, stating that informal en banc review is to be "in rare
instances" when prior precedent is "erroneously decided," infra note 96 and accompanying
text, do not provide meaningful standards governing the use of the procedure.
174. FED. R. App. P. 35; see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2004)
(overruling Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928)), vacated on other grounds,
543 U.S. 1097 (2005); Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 9 & n.5
(1st Cir. 1992) (overruling Buscaglia v. Ballester, 162 F.2d 805 (1st Cir. 1947)); Cont'l
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 892 F.2d 540, 540 n.* (7th Cir. 1989) (overruling
Paddleford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 100 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1938), regarding
the construction of an exclusion clause in an insurance contract); United States v. Read, 658
F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981) (overruling a 1977 case regarding burden of persuasion on
withdrawal from a conspiracy by reconsidering a 1912 Supreme Court case).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 729 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (overruling
United States v. Collado, 106 F.3d 1097 (2d Cir. 1997), decided the previous year); Lester v.
City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (overruling Gumz v. Morrissette,
772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), decided two years earlier).
178. United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127, 1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (overruling
seven cases dating back to 1991 concerning whether certain statutory requirements were
jurisdictional).
179. Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 612 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988).
180. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2004) (overruling a line of eight
prior cases decided between 1987 and 2003 by disavowing "the requirement that a plaintiff
alleging First Amendment retaliation has the burden of providing but-for causation").
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statutory, 18 1  procedural, 182 and state law. 183  The lack of articulated
standards results in arbitrary use of informal en banc review.
A particularly striking example is Russ v. Watts. 184 In that case, the
Seventh Circuit considered whether parents of a twenty-two-year-old
college student killed by a police officer had a liberty interest in their
relationship with their adult son for purposes of a § 1983 claim against the
state. 185 In a previous case, Bell v. City of Milwaukee,186 the court held that
a parent's "constitutional liberty interest in his relationship with his [adult]
son" was violated when his son was killed by police. 187 Twenty-one years
later, in Russ, the Seventh Circuit overruled Bell using the informal en banc
procedure.18 8 The court explained that several other circuits had considered
the question of the constitutional dimensions of a parent's right to a
relationship with an adult child and had reached the opposite conclusion
than the Seventh Circuit did in Bell.189 The court then explained its reason
for revisiting and rejecting Bell:
An analysis of the decisions of our sister circuits as well as a
reexamination of our own rationale in Bell convinces us that Bell was
wrongly decided. We do not make such a declaration lightly. Although
we must give considerable weight to our prior decisions, we are not bound
by them absolutely and may overturn Circuit precedent for compelling
reasons.... Other circuits' rejection of our position provides one such
compelling reason. As we have previously explained:
When a number of other circuits reject a position that we have taken,
and no other circuit accepts it, the interest in avoiding unnecessary
intercircuit conflicts comes into play; and if we are asked to
reexamine our position, we can hardly refuse. That is not to say that
reexamination will cause us to relinquish the position.... But if upon
conscientious reexamination we are persuaded that the other circuits
have the better of the argument, we should abandon our position in
order to spare the Supreme Court extra work.
That Bell stands alone causes us to reconsider its holding. We now see
that our conclusion that Dolphus Bell's parental liberty interest was
181. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ticktin, 832 F.2d 1438 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490
U.S. 82 (1989); Lorion v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
182. United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1994).
183. Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 706 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986);
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 109-10 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1977).
184. 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005).
185. Id. at 783.
186. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir.
2005).
187. Id. at 1243.
188. 414 F.3d at 784 n.1.
189. Id. at 787-88.
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violated by the killing of his son was not well grounded in the
Constitution or Supreme Court case law.19
0
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the substance of Russ, the court's
decision to revisit its prior opinion in Bell is certainly justifiable, and its
authority to do so is unquestioned. 191 But the question remains: Why
overrule Bell using an informal procedure rather than by convening the
court en banc? No judge voted to hear the case en banc, 192 presumably
meaning that all agreed with the outcome, 193 but unanimity alone is not a
sound justification for deviating from the formal en banc procedure. Bell
was not in conflict with other circuit precedent, and although other circuits
had ruled differently, the outcome in Russ v. Watts was hardly a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, the court needed close to six printed pages of analysis
to explain why it was overruling Bell.194 This seems like precisely the sort
of important change to the law justifying en banc review. 195
Another notable example is Felzen v. Andreas,196 which overrules prior
panel opinions on three separate procedural issues. It first concludes that
nonparties cannot appeal an adverse judgment in a shareholder derivative
suit, overruling three cases. 197 It then states that nonparty shareholders
cannot appeal in a derivative action, overruling another case. 198 As a final
matter, the panel determines that its jurisdictional holding cannot be
prospective only, overruling yet another case, albeit one that had been
rendered invalid by intervening Supreme Court precedent.' 99 Again, one is
left to wonder why formal en banc review was not warranted. An opinion
190. Id. at 788 (quoting United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1995)). United
States v. Hill, the case cited in Russ v. Watts to support the panel's decision to overrule Bell
v. City of Milwaukee, is an informal en banc case as well. In Hill, however, the government
agreed that the earlier opinion that the panel overruled was erroneously decided and no
longer constituted the government's position on the issue. Hill, 48 F.3d at 232. Of course, in
Russ, the plaintiffs did not agree with the court's treatment of the earlier case.
191. See supra notes 23-26.
192. Russ, 414 F.3d at 784 n.1.
193. It is possible, however, that there was disagreement over the outcome. See infra
notes 251-58 (discussing cases in which unanimous votes regarding rehearing en banc
masked disagreement on the court).
194. Russ, 414 F.3d at 785-91.
195. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (stating that en banc review is appropriate for questions of
exceptional importance). For another example, see United States v. Nordlof, 440 F.2d 840,
845 n.10 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated, 454 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1971) (en banc), in which the panel
overruled a prior panel opinion regarding conscientious objector status of persons drafted
into military service. Nordlof in particular, seems like it should have been decided with
formal en banc review given the events and political atmosphere at the time. Although the
opinion was later vacated en banc, that occurred as a result of intervening Supreme Court
precedent and was done through an order with no analysis.
196. 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).
197. Id. at 875 (overruling Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee, 616
F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980), Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976), and Research
Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970)).
198. Id. at 876 (overruling Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co., S. A., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th
Cir. 1975)).
199. Id. at 877 (overruling Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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that overrules no fewer than five prior panel opinions on three separate
issues is the type of significant change in the law meriting the formal
consideration of the full court.200
Felzen's overruling of multiple cases raises the question of use of
informal en banc review to overturn lines of authority. Changing a rule
established by a line of cases runs contrary to the very heart of horizontal
stare decisis and the consistency it is supposed to engender.20 1 This is
especially true when the panel must choose between competing lines of
authority; resolving an intracircuit conflict is one of the specific situations
justifying formal en banc review under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
(FRAP) 35.202 Entire lines of cases can hardly be characterized as minor
precedential annoyances, 203 which informal en banc review is supposed to
address. And yet, informal en banc review is used to change rules in ways
that overrule established lines of authority.
Felzen is not an isolated example. In United States v. Durrive,20 4 the
panel overruled at least thirteen cases on the test for measuring the
sufficiency of evidence of a defendant's participation in a conspiracy and
took a position that the Fifth Circuit adopted by en banc opinion. 20 5 In
Spiegla v. Hull,20 6 a First Amendment retaliation case, the court said it
"disavow[ed] the requirement that a plaintiff alleging First Amendment
retaliation has the burden of proving but-for causation" as a line of eight
prior cases had required.20 7 The court said the overruled cases were
contrary to the majority of relevant Seventh Circuit precedent but did not
employ en banc review to resolve the intracircuit conflict.20 8 Similarly, in
200. Other examples include Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000), in which
the court used informal en banc review because one portion of the opinion overruled in part a
prior panel opinion and two other portions addressed important administrative issues
regarding habeas corpus review, Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973),
which overruled three prior panel opinions on two separate issues, and United States v.
Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006), which overruled an unspecified number
of cases and listed three as examples of those its ruling invalidated.
201. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
202. FED. R. App. P. 35.
203. Wald, supra note 31, at 486 n.30.
204. 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).
205. Id. at 1225. The panel first traced the origins of the Seventh Circuit's "slight
evidence" rule, analyzing the cases on which it was based and explaining the approaches
taken by other circuits. Id. at 1225-26. The court then adopted the "substantial evidence"
test, explaining why this test was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1227.
206. 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004).
207. Id. at 941-42 ("Therefore, we disavow the requirement that a plaintiff alleging First
Amendment retaliation has the burden of proving but-for causation as recited in the
following cases": Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 2003); Abrams v. Walker,
307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2002); Love v. City of Chicago Board of Education, 241 F.3d
564, 569 (7th Cir. 2001); Thomsen v. Romeis, 198 F.3d 1022, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000); Johnson
v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1995); O'Connor v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 985 F.2d 1362, 1368 (7th Cir. 1993); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180,
1190 (7th Cir. 1988); and Button v. Harden, 814 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1987)).
208. Id. at 942.
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Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 209 the court used informal en banc
review to resolve a conflict between two lines of authority regarding the
appealability of an order granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. Johnson v. ApfeP10 overruled six
prior cases regarding the degree of specificity with which a claimant for
disability benefits must bring issues to a hearing examiner's attention in
order to preserve the issues for judicial review. In Lorion v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,211 the District of Columbia Circuit resolved a
conflict between two inconsistent lines of authority regarding the scope of
its subject matter jurisdiction under a federal statute.
Nor have the federal appellate courts limited themselves to overruling
cases on subsidiary issues when they use informal en banc review.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Christ212 announces, "This appeal raises
one issue: Should we overrule Rollins?" The court answers in the
affirmative, overruling the prior panel opinion in Rollins v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.2 13 The court then uses four and a half pages of analysis
to explain why Rollins conflicts with a federal statute, decisions from other
circuits, and a Supreme Court case before overruling it. 214 In Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Ticktin, 215 the court considered the
federal district court's jurisdiction to entertain a case in which the FLSIC
was a party, the sole issue on appeal. The case came to the court of appeals
through a provision that confers discretionary jurisdiction to accept an
interlocutory appeal when the case involves a controlling question of law
about which substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist. 216 The
Ticktin panel accepted jurisdiction and overruled an earlier panel opinion to
hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction,2 17 a ruling later reversed by
209. 57 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Fisher v. Vassar
Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1340 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
210. 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999).
211. 712 F.2d 1472, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting the court's inability to reconcile
the rationale of two prior opinions with its holding in a third opinion and an administrative
agency's interpretation of the law in light of the federal statute conferring jurisdiction).
212. 979 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1992).
213. 863 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1988), overruled by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d
575 (7th Cir. 1992).
214. Christ, 979 F.2d at 577-82. The verbiage associated with the overruling of a case is
not a perfect proxy for the importance of an issue. Sometimes unimportant issues are
complicated and require significant explanation, and sometimes courts gloss over important
issues with minimal or cryptic analysis. Nevertheless, when the analysis of an issue spans
multiple pages, it suggests that the issue is more involved than the less important issues to
which informal en banc review is supposed to be confined. See, e.g., Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d
783, 785-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (using approximately five and a half pages of analysis to justify
overruling a prior panel opinion); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (7th Cir.
1990) (using roughly three and a half pages of analysis to resolve a conflict between two
lines of authority).
215. 832 F.2d 1438 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 82 (1989).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). For discussion of this and other exceptions to the final
order doctrine, see generally Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A
Short Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 43 (2005).
217. Ticktin, 832 F.2d at 1446 n.3.
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the Supreme Court. If a question is subject to enough dispute and is
significant enough for discretionary interlocutory appeal and if it involves
overruling circuit precedent, it is difficult to see why it would not justify
formal en banc review.218
This is obviously not a complete catalog of all informal en banc cases,
but the examples illustrate the problems associated with the lack of
articulated standards defining when informal en banc review is appropriate.
It is impossible to tell why these cases merited informal en banc review
instead of formal en banc review. They involve overruling prior precedent.
They meet the standards for formal en banc review as set out in FRAP 35.
As compared with the cases cited in the prior section-overruling a single
outdated case that goes in a different direction than the rest of circuit
precedent, rejecting an interpretation of dicta that had the potential to direct
the development of circuit precedent in unexpected ways, announcing a
new policy for addressing attorney misconduct2 19-these examples seem
like precisely the sorts of cases that should have been subject to formal en
banc review. Without at least some criteria for determining which cases are
eligible to be overruled with informal en banc disposition, the procedure
can be and is used arbitrarily.
The lack of standards also undermines the law of the circuit rule, thereby
weakening the principle of horizontal stare decisis in a way that threatens
judicial legitimacy. When the courts start developing exceptions to the
principle of stare decisis, they risk heading down a slippery slope because
there are no external checks on the use of the procedures. The courts
themselves are both the creators and enforcers of the rules, as well as the
exceptions to the rules. 220 The lack of meaningful guidelines defining the
appropriate use of informal en banc review creates the risk that informal
procedures will eclipse formal en banc review, effectively vitiating the law
of the circuit rule.
Concern regarding the effect of informal en banc review on the law of the
circuit rule has not escaped judicial notice. In Watts v. Burkhart,221 the
dissent was based on failure to adhere to the law of the circuit rule, not on
the merits of the decision. After reciting the requirement that the court
convene en banc to overrule a panel opinion, the dissent explained that,
merits aside, the use of informal en banc review "eviscerates the law of this
218, See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1031-32 & nn.127-28 (explaining that even
opinions that are exceptionally important only to the parties are appropriate cases for formal
en banc review); Wald, supra note 31, at 486 n.29 (noting that judges may call for formal en
banc review in cases that, although not significant for the development of circuit law, are
exceptionally important to the parties).
219. See cases cited supra note 157.
220. Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
645, 690-91 (2006) (identifying the difficulty of having judges in charge of evaluating the
validity of rules of precedent of their own making).
221. No. 89-6160, 1991 WL 261224, at *9-11 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1991) (Contie, J.,
dissenting), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(overruling Manion v. Michigan Board of Medicine, 765 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1985)).
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circuit in regard to overruling Sixth Circuit precedents, which is necessary
in order to ensure the finality of our decisions." 222 Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson articulated similar concerns in connection with the District of
Columbia Circuit's informal en banc review process:
I believe our Irons footnote procedure has serious flaws. It has
evolved from an expedient device to reconcile inconsistent circuit
holdings into a summary method of overruling unambiguous circuit
precedent, without any of the safeguards or formalities attending the en
banc process. A three-judge panel determines that full-court
consideration is warranted and non-panel members concur without benefit
of briefing or argument. The resulting decision is then announced by
footnote. Reasoned decisionmaking and stare decisis call for a more
deliberate process. If we wish to change our precedent, we should invoke
the en banc mechanism expressly authorized for that purpose by the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 223
The response to this is that the courts would not forego formal en banc
review altogether; they simply use informal en banc procedures to overrule
circuit precedent as a convenience in the limited circumstances in which it
is appropriate to do so. The problem with this argument is that it is one that
has been raised before-in the context of nonprecedential opinions. Now
nonprecedential opinions pose a significant threat to the principles of stare
decisis and the legitimacy of the courts.224 In fact, the parallels between
both the justifications for and the risks of issuing nonprecedential opinions
and those associated with informal en banc review are striking.
The reasons articulated for issuing nonprecedential opinions are as
follows: they are more efficient for resolving "clear cut" cases without the
substantial effort that drafting precedential opinions requires; courts can
distinguish cases that require precedential opinions from those that do not;
even though the opinions are not binding precedent, judges will give them
the same careful attention and consideration that they do precedential
opinions. 225 All of the same could be said of informal en banc procedures:
they are more efficient for overruling outdated, invalidated, or simply
wrong precedent without the substantial effort that full en banc review
requires; courts can distinguish which cases require formal en banc review
to be overruled from those that do not; even though judges do not engage in
full en banc review, they give the cases careful attention and consideration.
Now consider what has happened with nonprecedential opinions. What
was intended to be a limited exception to the practice of issuing binding
222. Id. at *11.
223. In re Sealed Case, 181 F.3d 128, 146 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Henderson, J.,
concurring).
224. See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2004); Richman & Reynolds, supra note
2; Sloan, supra note 15.
225. See generally K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?:
Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 397 (2001);
see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 1182-85.
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opinions is now the predominant mode of disposition for cases resolved on
the merits in the federal appellate courts. Almost eighty-five percent of
opinions are nonprecedential. 226 It is entirely possible that informal en banc
procedures will take the same course, gradually eclipsing formal en banc
review so that the exception becomes the norm. It is already the case in two
circuits (the Second 227 and Seventh 228) that informal en banc cases
outnumber formal en banc cases. It is not out of the question that informal
en banc review will become, like nonprecedential opinions, an
uncomfortable problem from which the federal appellate courts must avert
their gaze. 229 It is indeed ironic that a procedure with similar risks has the
potential to help solve the nonprecedential opinion problem. 230 But solving
one legitimacy problem with another suspect procedure might just
compound the problem. As the saying goes, two wrongs don't make a
right.
One could argue that the law of the circuit rule has already been eroded
beyond recognition as a result of nonprecedential opinions. Given the
limited contexts in which the law of the circuit rule applies (in only roughly
fifteen percent of cases decided on the merits), concerns about a couple of
hundred informal en banc cases may be misplaced. The relatively low
number of informal en banc cases, however, is what makes addressing the
problem easy in comparison to the nonprecedential opinion problem. If
resolving a few more cases each year with formal en banc review solves a
host of legitimacy concerns and preserves the law of the circuit rule, that
seems like the better course of action.
2. Hiding the Law
When courts use informal en banc review, they usually indicate that fact
by footnote. As noted above, sometimes the footnote simply notes the use
226. During the twelve months ending September 30, 2007, 83.5% of cases terminated on
the merits in twelve of the federal circuits were disposed of by unpublished opinion. AD~rN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 71, at 48
tbl.S-3. For these twelve circuits, the percentage ranged from a low of 55% in the Seventh
Circuit to a high of 93% in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit does not report the number of nonprecedential
opinions it issues to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See id One study,
however, concluded that the Federal Circuit resolved 77% of its cases from October 1, 1982,
through October 23, 2003, with nonprecedential opinions, with annual figures ranging from
a low of 62% in 1983 to a high of 84% in 1996. Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Comment, Please Ignore
This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1013, 1028 (2004).
227. See supra p. 738, fig.2 (Second Circuit chart).
228. See supra p. 739, fig.2 (Seventh Circuit chart). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has used
informal en banc review more times than all of the other circuits combined.
229. Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 73 (2005) (making the "avert their gaze" comment in the
context of nonprecedential opinions and FRAP 32.1).
230. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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of the procedure, but sometimes the overruling itself goes in a footnote. 231
Indeed, sometimes entire dissents from rehearing en banc appear in the
footnote as well. 232 At other times, cryptic footnotes inserted with the
caption to the case simply indicate informal en banc review without saying
why or for which issue.233
When that happens, the court is obscuring the law. Courts simply should
not be hiding action as significant as overruling prior cases or announcing
new rules of law in their footnotes. They have been known to consider the
arguments parties raise by footnote to be waived.234 In fact, one informal
en banc case that overrules prior opinions by footnote itself refuses to
consider an argument that a party raised only by footnote.235 Why, then,
should courts be able to hide some of the most significant actions they take
in footnotes? If they are going to change the law, they should do so
prominently and clearly so that people can tell what the law is.
This is not simply a matter of appearances. Legal research is more
difficult when important principles are relegated to footnotes. Case
research is accomplished primarily by subject (using digests or other
subject compilations of case summaries) and by words in the document
(using electronic word searches). 236 When the content is in the footnotes, it
may not be reflected in the headnotes, which are then used to create West
key number and other subject compilations.237 The use of word searches
may capture cases the digesting process misses. But even that requires
231. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
232. This is most common in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d
1356, 1368 n.* (7th Cir. 1988) (deciding a case with informal en banc review with the entire
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc appearing in the footnote); Lester v. City of
Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (dissenting reasoning included entirely
within the footnote); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 n.7 (7th Cir. 1977)
(dissenting reasoning and a comment from another judge included entirely within a
footnote); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (dissenting
view entirely in a footnote), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
233. Again, this is most common in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. West,
670 F.2d 675, 675 n.* (7th Cir. 1982) (containing a footnote placed in the caption
immediately following the date of the opinion providing only as follows: "Pursuant to
Circuit Rule 16, this opinion has been circulated among all judges of this Court in regular
active service. No judge favored a hearing en banc"); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661
F.2d 638, 638 n.b (7th Cir. 1981) (containing a footnote placed in the caption immediately
following the date of the opinion providing only as follows: "Pursuant to Circuit Rule 16(e),
this opinion has been circulated among all of the active judges of the court. No judge
requested a rehearing en banc.").
234. See, e.g., United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council
v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 60 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1987).
235. United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 332 n.8 (2d Cir. 1999).
236. AMY E. SLOAN, BAsIc LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS & STRATEGIEs 83-84, 99-104 (4th
ed. 2009).
237. Id. at 84. Compare Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir.
1997) (overruling of a prior case by informal en banc review noted in the West editorial
summary and headnotes), with Mapp, 170 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1999) (overruling of a prior case
by informal en banc footnote not noted in the West editorial summary or headnotes).
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reading the footnotes carefully to see whether a substantive discussion in
the text also happens to overrule one or more prior cases. Citators will, of
course, indicate a later citation to a case even if that citation appears in a
footnote. 238 But citator treatment descriptions are incomplete; unless the
informal en banc case specifically states that it is overruling a prior case, the
citator treatment indicator may be ambiguous and fail to alert researchers to
the true significance of the later informal en banc case. 239 Further, not all
informal en banc cases affect the validity of earlier precedent; sometimes
they announce new rules of law or address questions of first impression.
Nothing in a citator entry will alert a researcher to the use of informal en
banc review in those circumstances.
3. Effect on Traditionally Marginalized Groups
Another concern that informal en banc procedures create is that their use
will be concentrated among cases involving traditionally marginalized
groups, whether for purposes of overruling prior precedent or other reasons.
Again, the parallel to nonprecedential opinions arises. It has been
documented that many cases involving traditionally marginalized groups,
such as criminal defendants, prisoners, civil rights plaintiffs, and persons
seeking public assistance, are resolved through nonprecedential opinions
because these cases are not considered important enough to merit the effort
that precedential opinions require. 240 In the context of informal en banc
procedures, the percentage of criminal cases raises red flags. From 2003
through 2007, criminal cases comprised anywhere from 29.69% to 38.02%
of the federal appellate docket, for an average of approximately 33.93%.241
Although the percentage of cases in each category justifying en banc review
could not be expected to mirror the percentage they comprise of the docket
precisely, these numbers do suggest that, over time, there would be
238. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 236, at 129.
239. See Sloan, supra note 164, at 925 n.203 (discussing ambiguities in citator treatment
descriptions).
240. Pether, supra note 224, at 1438-39.
241. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra
note 71, at 90 tbl.B-1A (showing 14,505 criminal cases out of 38,740 total, constituting
about 37.44% of all cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 107 tbl.B-1A (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf (showing
14,589 criminal cases out of 38,366 total, constituting about 38.02% of all cases); ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 106 tbl.B-1A (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendicesb1a.pdf (showing 11,681 criminal cases out
of 35,141 total, constituting about 33.24% of all cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
81 tbl.B- 1A (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b1a.pdf
(showing 10,217 criminal cases out of 32,655 total, constituting about 31.28% of all cases);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 75 tbl.B-LA (2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/bla.pdf (showing 9925 criminal cases out
of 33,419 constituting about 29.69% of all cases).
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significantly more civil cases meriting informal en banc review than
criminal cases simply by virtue of their predominance on the docket. Yet
that is not the case with informal en bane review. This suggests that
criminal defendants may not be getting the benefit of formal en banc review
as frequently as civil litigants are. 242
4. Negative Impact on Collegiality
Calls for formal en bane review can negatively affect the collegiality of
the court.243 While informal en bane review can mitigate the tensions
formal en bane review can create, it also has the potential to create tensions
of its own. These tensions arise both because of the way en banc review
operates and because of the lack of consensus regarding appropriate use of
the procedure.
The way informal en bane review operates can negatively affect the
collegiality of the court. This is because, in most circuits, only a majority
of the court must approve action taken through informal en bane review; the
procedure usually does not require unanimous action.244 What should
happen (and what usually happens) when a majority of judges declines to
undertake formal en banc review of a case is that the status quo is
maintained. With informal en bane review, however, if judges who
disagree with the proposed action cannot garner enough votes to force
formal en bane review, the panel then becomes free to change the status quo
by taking the proposed action.
For example, assume a judge calls for a vote on whether to undertake
formal en banc review of a case that poses the issue of overruling Precedent
X. If the vote is negative, Precedent X remains the law of the circuit. If the
vote is positive, the case is heard by the full court, and Precedent X is either
upheld or overruled. Now assume that a panel proposes overruling
Precedent X and invokes informal en banc review. If a majority votes to
hear the case en banc, Precedent X again is either upheld or overruled by the
full court, which is the same as the formal en banc scenario. But if a
majority does not vote to hear the case en banc, the panel will consider
itself free to overrule Precedent X. The decision regarding whether to hear
a case en banc is necessarily probabilistic and based on less complete
information than would be available for formal en banc review on the
merits. 245 Thus, the minority of judges who oppose the panel's decision to
242. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991-2002, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 259, 261 tbl.1 (2002) (noting the infrequency with which the District of
Columbia Circuit heard criminal cases en banc from 1981-2002).
243. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1013; see also supra notes 160-63 and
accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
245. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1032-33. If the vote for en banc review were the
equivalent of consideration on the merits, reargument and rebriefing would be unnecessary
in formal en banc review because the panel's decision and proffered justification for
overruling Precedent Xwould be sufficient to determine the merits. Id. at 1033.
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overrule Precedent X will not have had the same opportunity to persuade
colleagues to their point of view in the informal en banc vote that they
would have had in the formal en banc review process. Judges who oppose a
panel's proposed informal en banc action may feel marginalized or
otherwise aggrieved by having the panel take that action without formal en
banc consideration.
This situation can be avoided if informal en banc review is used only
when the vote to forego formal en banc review and adopt the panel's
position is unanimous. The District of Columbia Circuit's policy requires
unanimous acquiescence. 246 The Tenth Circuit policy appears to be the
same, in that its informal en banc footnotes all indicate unanimity. 247 But
that is not the case in all circuits. The Seventh Circuit routinely overrules
circuit precedent in panel opinions over the dissent of multiple judges.248
The First Circuit's footnotes often indicate whether the panel's action is
approved unanimously or by a majority of the judges, 249 but it is impossible
to tell whether this is just a variation in terminology or a true expression of
some disagreement on the court. The Second Circuit's cases typically
indicate only that the opinion was circulated and do not indicate the degree
of agreement or disagreement with the panel's disposition.250
Further, the indication that the panel's action is unanimously approved,
or at least that no objection was interposed, can mask disagreement over the
proper disposition of the case. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in United States
v. Atencio251 is a case in point. In that case, the court's informal en banc
footnote indicates that the decision to overrule a prior case was
unanimous.252
246. Policy Statement, supra note 58, at 2. Not only must the decision be unanimous
among all voting judges, but the total affirmative votes, even including recusals, must
constitute an absolute majority of the court's active members. Id.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (indicating
that all judges agreed with the panel's disposition); United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127,
1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (indicating that each member of the court concurred with the
panel's holding); Estate of True v. Comm'r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1226 n.13 (10th Cir. 2004)
(indicating that the members of the en bane court unanimously agreed with the panel's
disposition).
248. See supra notes 122-23 (citing informal en bane cases from the Seventh Circuit
without unanimous acquiescence).
249. Compare Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004) (indicating that nojudge objected to the panel's disposition of the case), with In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123
F.3d 695, 697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (indicating that a majority of the judges approved of the
panel's disposition of the case).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 132 n.18 (2d Cir. 2005); Schulz
v. IRS, 395 F.3d 463, 465 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 155
n.9 (2d Cir. 2004). Occasionally, the Second Circuit will indicate that no judge requested
rehearing en banc, see, e.g., Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 n.7
(2d Cir. 2003), or that all judges agree with the disposition, see, e.g., New Pac. Overseas
Group (U.S.A.) Inc., v. Excal Int'l Dev. Corp., 252 F.3d 667, 670 n.1 (2d Cir. 2001).
251. 476 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007).
252. Id. at 1105 n.6; see also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 n.5 (7th Cir.
1977) (noting that the vote to rehear the case en banc was evenly split), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655
(1978).
[Vol. 78
THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK
In fact, however, the Atencio decision was the subject of considerable
disagreement on the court. Six of the twelve judges eligible to vote voted
for en banc consideration of the case. The case was not heard en banc,
therefore, because the court was evenly divided and the decision to
undertake en banc review requires a majority vote.253 The opinion is
accompanied by a dissent from denial of en banc review joined by three
judges who criticize the panel's opinion.254 Even though the vote to
overrule the earlier case was unanimous, the rule Atencio put in its place
was not unanimously accepted. The same issue arose in Deppe v. Tripp,2 55
in which differences arose not over the result in the case, but over the use of
.nformal en banc review. As the dissent from the denial of rehearing noted,
informal en banc approval indicates to the public that the full court
approves of both the holding and the rationale.256 In Deppe, the dissenting
judge agreed with the result but felt that the issues addressed in the panel
opinion needed further development and clarification, thus rendering
informal en banc endorsement of the opinion inappropriate. 257 These cases
demonstrate that the apparent agreement underlying informal en banc cases
may be overstated.258
In addition to disagreement over using informal en banc review in
inappropriate circumstances, discord has also arisen over failure to invoke
informal en banc review when others on the court thought it was required.
The language in the concurrence in the District of Columbia Circuit's In re
Sealed Case259 is especially sharp:
As the majority opinion notes .... the panel here explicitly acknowledged
that its holding "contradicts our holding in [United States v. Ortez,] ...
that district courts lack authority to consider substantial assistance [to the
government when sentencing a criminal defendant] absent a government
motion [regarding the defendant's assistance] .... " While it did discuss,
253. Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1100 (order denying initial en banc review).
254. Id. at 1108 (Murphy, J., joined by Kelly & Briscoe, JJ., dissenting).
255. 863 F.2d 1356 (7th Cir. 1988).
256. Id. at 1368 n.* (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
257. Id.
258. Boston and Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pacific Corp., 785 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986), is
another example of the ways disagreement creeps into decisions characterized as unanimous.
In that case, a footnote (n.*) accompanying the caption of the case states that no judge
requested rehearing en banc regarding the overruling of a prior panel bankruptcy opinion in a
case related to the case before the court. The majority panel opinion in fact mentions the
prior bankruptcy opinion only in note* and in the explanation of the background of the case;
it does not analyze or otherwise discuss the case. Id. at 563-64. In an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, however, Judge John Coffey states that the majority's holding
effectively overrules the prior bankruptcy opinion. Id. at 567 (Coffey, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He then states that he agrees that the earlier opinion should be
overruled, but that the court should do so overtly, rather than ignoring the prior bankruptcy
opinion. Id. Further, although he agrees with one part of the majority's holding, he disagrees
with another part of it. Id. The en banc footnote, therefore, does not seem to capture fully
the differences of opinion regarding proper disposition of the case that existed even among
the members of the three-judge panel.
259. 181 F.3d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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and then reject, Ortez[,] concluding that "[A later Supreme Court case]
effectively overrules that aspect of Ortez[,]" . . . it did so with no Irons
footnote seeking en bane endorsement (based presumably on "an
intervening Supreme Court decision" making Ortez "clearly an incorrect
statement of current law"). Had the panel opinion been circulated to the
full court with an Irons footnote, the opinion would not have been
endorsed unanimously as required (as manifested by today's lopsided vote
to the contrary) and it could not have issued in the form it did. The fact
that we are correcting our course now does not, and should not, obscure
what necessitated the correction. 2 60
Some degree of discord among judges is probably unavoidable, and
almost any decisional process carries the potential to create disagreements.
Informal en banc review is no different. For all the benefits to collegiality it
can provide, it also has the potential to create rifts on the court, just as
formal en banc review does.
5. Denying Parties an Opportunity To Participate
Judges with minority views are not the only ones deprived of meaningful
opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process when panels
invoke informal en banc review. The parties to the case also lose their
chance to influence the court because they are completely cut out of the
process. Parties can ask for formal en banc review using the procedures
outlined in FRAP 35. Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled in Western Pacific
Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.261 that fundamental
fairness requires giving litigants an opportunity to participate in the process
through the right to suggest rehearing en banc. Even if the judges vote sua
sponte to rehear a case en banc, the parties ordinarily receive notice that the
court is reconsidering its position and have an opportunity to persuade the
court to adopt their position through additional briefing and oral argument.
Not so with informal en banc review. Parties cannot invoke the
procedure and cannot predict when it might be used. Consequently, their
litigation strategy may be compromised. Parties cannot be sure whether
they should attempt to distinguish or limit contrary precedent or argue for
informal en banc overruling. They also cannot be sure whether they can
rely on established precedent. They may build a litigation strategy around
circuit precedent only to have the panel unexpectedly overrule it. With
260. Id. at 146 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted); see also
United States v. VanMeter, 278 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2002) (Lucero, J., concurring)
(criticizing the majority for failing to seek en banc review before rejecting a prior panel
opinion, citing Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2001), which employed
informal en banc review to overrule prior circuit precedent); United States v. Castiglia, 894
F.2d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 1990) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting from the majority's opinion on the ground that it effectively overrules a prior
panel opinion without invoking either formal or informal en banc review), reh "g denied, id.
(per curiam) (stating that prior to filing the opinion was circulated to all active judges).
261. 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953); see also Part II.A (discussing the development of formal
en banc review procedures).
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informal en banc review, the parties lose their opportunity to participate in
the process and may find themselves disadvantaged by an unanticipated
change in the law. This runs contrary to the premises underlying the
adversarial system and subjects litigants to unfair surprise.
6. Uncertain Precedential Status
The precedential force of informal en banc opinions is another question.
En banc opinions have, practically if not jurisprudentially, greater
precedential weight than panel opinions do. Under the law of the circuit
rule, the court must convene en banc to overrule prior precedent, 262
regardless of whether the prior precedent was decided by a panel or the full
court. In that sense, therefore, cases decided en banc have no greater
precedential value that those decided by a panel. Nevertheless, formal en
banc opinions are often presumed to carry greater precedential force than
panel opinions.2 63 As the Supreme Court has explained, a circuit court
convenes en banc "only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for
authoritative consideration and decision by those charged with the
administration and development of the law of the circuit. '264 As a practical
matter, it is hard to persuade a federal appellate court to undertake formal
en bane review of a case. 265 Having heard an issue en bane, therefore, the
court will probably be even less inclined to take it up again, at least in the
short run, thus conferring a greater practical weight on a formal en bane
opinion.
It is unclear whether informal en bane opinions have the status of panel
opinions, the status of formal en bane opinions, or some unique status. The
federal appellate courts themselves are unclear on whether informal en bane
262. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
263. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 3, at 536-37. Even the Seventh Circuit, which has
a fairly liberal view of the law of the circuit rule, applies the rule strictly to formal en banc
opinions:
[N]o matter how many other courts may have reached a conclusion contrary to our
own, absent Supreme Court pronouncement to the contrary or legislative revision,
a panel of this court is bound by a prior (and recent) decision of the court reached
en banc.... En banc consideration is required to overrule such a decision....
Hence, for purposes of decision by this panel, [a prior formal en banc opinion]
states the applicable law, and we must reject respondents' argument that it should
be overruled. Appropriate principles of stare decisis make it quite undesirable for
us to reconsider here the legal propositions announced in [a prior formal en banc
opinion].
Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1980) (footnotes and citations
omitted), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U.S. 902 (1981). On a
similar note, denial of en banc review has been said to strengthen the authoritative value of a
panel opinion. Wald, supra note 31, at 484.
264. United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960) (emphasis
added).
265. Formal en banc review is not a frequent occurrence in most circuits. See Barrett,
supra note 3, at 1046 (estimating that the federal appellate courts hear less than one percent
of their cases en banc); supra p. 728, fig. 1.
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cases constitute true en banc cases. 266 The boilerplate Irons footnote used
in the District of Columbia Circuit emphasizes that the opinion has been
"considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes the law of
the circuit. ' 267 In the First Circuit, the court emphasizes that an informal en
banc opinion is not an en banc opinion, stating that the informal en banc
procedure, "needless to say, does not convert this opinion into an en banc
decision nor preclude a suggestion of rehearing en banc on any issue in the
case."
268
The Second Circuit implies that the circulated opinion constitutes en
banc review in at least one opinion. The court states the requirement that it
convene en banc to overrule circuit precedent and then explains that the
opinion has been circulated to the full court, thereby suggesting that the
action taken meets the requirements of the law of the circuit rule.269 Like
the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit acknowledges the law of the circuit
rule and then says that, because the other judges did not object to the
panel's taking action that requires en banc review, the panel deems itself
authorized to so act.270 This language suggests, but does not clearly
indicate, that the panel's opinion is tantamount to a formal en banc opinion.
The Seventh Circuit's local rule establishing procedures for informal en
banc review says nothing about the weight or status of an opinion invoking
the procedure. 271  One of the Eighth Circuit's few informal en banc
opinions implies that the opinion is, in fact, a formal en banc opinion: "As
a matter of court procedure, a panel cannot overrule a prior panel opinion of
266. Procedural irregularities can also render the status of cases subject to informal en
banc procedures uncertain. For example, in one case, a divided panel circulated its opinion
to the full court seeking approval to overrule two prior panel opinions. Anschul v. Sitmar
Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364, 1365 n.** (7th Cir. 1976). The full court voted with the panel
dissenter not to overrule the cases. Id. The opinion, therefore, which is denominated a per
curiam opinion, is written by the original panel's dissenter and is said to represent the views
of that judge and the majority of the full court. The two other judges on the panel filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 1369 (Swygert & Bauer, JJ., dissenting). It is unclear how a panel
opinion with two dissenting judges should be treated; presumably, the per curiam "majority"
opinion has some force as the opinion of all but two members of the court, especially
because it declines to overrule the earlier cases, but this is not clear.
267. Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord Chung v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 278 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. Rostenkowski, 59
F.3d 1291, 1299 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1995).
268. Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 9 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992).
This notation, that the court is not ruling en banc and does not preclude a suggestion for en
banc review, first appears in Trailer Marine Transportation Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez and
then in footnotes in later cases. See, e.g., Educadores Puertorriquefios en Acci6n v.
Herndndez, 367 F.3d 61, 67 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (1st
Cir. 2004); Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 138 n.1
(1st Cir. 2000).
269. United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007).
270. Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 612 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988); Koonce v. Quaker
Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 706 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986).
271. 7THCfR. R. 40(e).
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this court. For that reason, this opinion has been circulated to the court en
banc, and the court en banc has approved it."'2 72
The Tenth Circuit has modified the wording of its informal en bane
footnote over time. When the procedure was first used and for several years
thereafter, the footnote provided as follows: "Because this panel opinion
overrules Tenth Circuit precedent, it has been circulated among all the
judges of this court in regular active service. All judges have expressed
agreement with the conclusions expressed herein" with respect to the
proposed action.273 More recently, a different turn of phrase has started to
appear saying that the opinion "[has] been circulated to the en bane court,"
which unanimously agrees to the proposed action.274 In a 2007 case, the
court's panel opinion used the following language: "For these reasons, the
en bane court now overrules" a prior circuit precedent, 275 although the
underlying disagreement about that case may have prompted the stronger
language in the informal en bane footnote. 276 Each iteration of the footnote
language suggests in stronger terms that the panel's action is tantamount to
formal en bane review.
These variations in language create questions about the weight of the
opinions and the very nature of the courts' actions. While the First Circuit
goes to pains to emphasize that the opinion is only a panel opinion, other
circuits imply or even expressly state the opposite. The First Circuit's
disclaimer is especially curious in its statement that the opinion does not
preclude a party's request to rehear the case en bane. When a panel invokes
informal en bane review, that generally means that a majority of judges did
not vote for formal en bane review of the case. Thus, the utility of a party's
request for en bane review is questionable, unless the court is admitting that
the other judges did not engage meaningfully with the case 277 and might
reconsider the en bane vote upon briefing by the parties.
The District of Columbia Circuit's language is confusing in saying that
the opinion is the law of the circuit because all panel opinions (at least all
published or precedential ones) 27 8 are the law of the circuit.279 The court
272. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 779 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1990).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990); accord
Reppy v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 874 F.2d 728, 730 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Gaddis,
733 F.2d 1373, 1377 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984).
274. Estate of True v. Comm'r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1226 n.13 (10th Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127, 1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Goff,
314 F.3d 1248, 1250 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Pena-Sarabia, 297 F.3d 983, 989
n.2 (10th Cir. 2002).
275. United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1105 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007).
276. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part III.B.7 (discussing the problem of potentially inadequate
consideration of informal en bane cases).
278. See Sloan, supra note 164, at 921-22 (discussing the uncertain status of
nonprecedential opinions in the District of Columbia Circuit).
279. See, e.g., Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 198
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
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could be trying to convey that an Irons footnote case has some stronger
precedential weight than a panel opinion (equivalent to that of an en banc
opinion) because it was approved by the full court. The statement could
also mean that the case cannot be disregarded later on the ground that one
panel cannot overrule an earlier panel. The court's intent is unclear, and its
policy statement governing informal en bane review sheds no light on the
matter.
If informal en bane opinions are treated simply as panel opinions, can a
later panel (using the informal en banc procedure) overrule the prior
informal en banc cases, or do these cases have enough precedential force
that the court would have to invoke formal en banc review to undo them? 280
Can a panel use informal en bane review to overrule a prior formal en banc
opinion? If informal en banc review is equivalent to formal en banc review,
there is no reason why this could not happen.281 Although it is possible to
speculate about how informal en bane opinions fit within the hierarchy of
precedent, at bottom, these questions do not have answers. The courts have
not addressed, either by rule or in their opinions, the status of informal en
bane opinions.
280. I have not found cases in which an opinion that uses informal en banc review to
overrule a prior panel opinion is itself overruled by a later informal en banc opinion. In
Granberry v. Thieret, 823 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1987), the panel declined to overrule
a prior panel opinion that had employed informal en banc review to overrule yet another
panel opinion. The Seventh Circuit has, however, used multiple informal en banc cases to
develop rules of law. For example, United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104, 1104 n.* (7th
Cir. 1990), used informal en banc review to decide, as a question of first impression in the
circuit, that a federal arson statute applied to a private residence whose only connection to
interstate commerce was the natural gas hook up. This opinion was later modified by an
informal en banc footnote in United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 529 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998),
which said that the question of connection to interstate commerce was properly raised for the
first time on appeal as plain error. Id. at 532. Stillwell was later abrogated on the substantive
issue in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 852 n.2 (2000). In another instance, the court
used an informal en banc footnote to decide a question of first impression in United States v.
West, 670 F.2d 675, 675 n.* & 686 (7th Cir. 1982). West was later overruled by informal en
banc footnote in United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001). United States
v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1982), provides a third example. In that case, the court
used informal en banc review to create an intercircuit conflict with the Ninth Circuit
regarding the intent requirement in a federal criminal statute. Id. at 1011 n.*. Anton was
later overruled by informal en banc review in United States v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253 F.3d
276, 277 (7th Cir. 2001).
281. Although it is unusual for a court to use informal en banc review to overrule a prior
en banc opinion, this has occurred from time to time. See, e.g., United States v. Marble, 940
F.2d 1543, 1547 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 1991) (overruling United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300
(D.C. Cir. 1980), United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and Whalem v.
United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc), in light of later statutory and
Supreme Court authority); Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 849 n.* (7th Cir. 1989) (overruling
Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc), in light of a later Supreme Court
opinion, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988)). Because the earlier cases had been
undermined by intervening superior authority, however, the panels could have overruled
them by invoking an exception to the law of the circuit rule without seeking informal en
bane approval. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Accordingly, although a panel's
use of informal en bane review to overrule an earlier en banc case could be questioned,
doing so in these cases was not clearly in violation of the law of the circuit rule.
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7. Quality of Engagement
Informal en banc review necessarily involves less rigorous review than
formal en banc review does. Parties do not rebrief or reargue the case; the
decision is based on the panel's proposed opinion and whatever justification
the panel provides.282 Indeed, the entire purpose of informal en banc
review is to allow for full court review without the effort formal en banc
review requires. If the informal process were not less work, the courts
would not use it. This diminished degree of review, however, presents
problems, especially in circuits that allow informal en banc endorsement of
an opinion based on lack of objection from other members of the bench,
rather than affirmative acquiescence.
In the Fifth 283 and Seventh Circuits,284 lack of objection from colleagues
empowers a panel to take the proposed action and indicate informal en banc
approval. In the District of Columbia 285 and Tenth 286 Circuits, affirmative
agreement is required. In the First and Second Circuits, the standard is
unclear; some informal en banc cases indicate only lack of objection,287
whereas others indicate active consensus or acquiescence among the
members of the court.288 Indeed, some Second Circuit cases state only that
the opinion was circulated, with no indication of the reaction of the rest of
the court to the panel's opinion.289
There is a significant difference between failure to object and affirmative
agreement. The first option permits, in essence, an answer of silence.
Nothing in the process indicates that all, or even any, of the judges have
truly considered the question. The second option allows the jurisprudential
282. See, e.g., Policy Statement, supra note 58, at 2 (requiring a "substantive
memorandum" from the panel explaining why informal en banc review is appropriate for the
case).
283. Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611, 612 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (indicating that none
of the judges objected or called for the case to be heard en banc); Koonce v. Quaker Safety
Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 706 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
284. The Seventh Circuit's rule provides that the panel can act so long as a majority of the
court's judges "do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be
adopted." 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). This is a bit different from the Fifth Circuit's approach because
it appears to invite a formal en banc vote. But it is still a "no objection" approach as
opposed to an affirmative agreement approach. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1016.
285. Policy Statement, supra note 58, at 2.
286. See cases cited supra note 247 (indicating agreement or concurrence with the panel's
disposition, not mere lack of objection thereto).
287. See, e.g., Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 n.7 (2d Cir.
2003) (indicating that no active judge sought formal en banc review); Carpenters Local
Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 138 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the
opinion was circulated and no active judge objected to the proposed action).
288. See, e.g., New Pac. Overseas Group (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Excal Int'l Dev. Corp., 252 F.3d
667, 670 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2001) (indicating that the opinion was circulated and all active judges
on the court expressed agreement with the panel's disposition of the case); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the majority of active judges
approved the panel's action).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007); Adeleke v.
United States, 355 F.3d 144, 155 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004).
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equivalent of what could be called an "okay, fine" answer, one that calls for
minimal engagement, although at least it calls for an affirmative response.
When a panel circulates an opinion indicating the action it proposes and
asking for approval, judges can agree without fully considering the matter.
Judges are likely to defer to their colleagues on the panel who have been
considering the matter more seriously. Further, the decision is necessarily
based on incomplete information. It is roughly equivalent to the amount of
information available on a call for an en banc vote, which is also inherently
tentative because of incomplete information. 290 But instead of being a vote
to consider the case more fully, the informal en banc vote is one
affirmatively to adopt the panel's position.
This observation is not intended to impugn the judiciary or suggest that
judges are failing to consider the cases before them. There are a number of
informal en banc cases in which one or more judges voted to hear the case
en banc and even dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. 291 This
suggests meaningful engagement with the case. And the fact that a decision
is unanimous does not, by itself, indicate lack of serious consideration. The
point is simply that most people, when faced with a question for which
failure to object constitutes agreement or which can be answered with
abbreviated review, are not going to give the matter the degree of attention
that they would give a question requiring a substantive response, especially
when the answer is based on limited information. The risk that the degree
of engagement with overruling prior precedent will fall below acceptable
standards is real. 292 This risk has to be balanced against the benefits
informal en banc review provides. At least in the context of overruling
circuit precedent, it does not justify the risk. 293
III. FORMALIZING STANDARDS AND PROCESSES FOR LEGITIMATE USE OF
INFORMAL EN BANC REVIEW
Given both the advantages and disadvantages of informal en banc review,
what should the federal appellate courts do? The real solution is a complete
reevaluation of the hierarchy of circuit precedent. William Richman has
noted that panel precedent has acquired a "hyperprecedential" status. 294
290. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1032-34 (describing the inherent uncertainty
about the merits of a case in a vote on formal en bane review and the comparatively greater
expertise panel judges have with respect to the case).
291. See supra cases cited notes 253-57.
292. This again is a concern that arises in the context of nonprecedential opinions: that
judges do not give the same degree of attention to opinions that will not be binding on future
tribunals and delegate decision making to clerks and staff attorneys. See generally Pether,
supra note 2.
293. Cf Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1368 n.* (7th Cir. 1988) (Ripple, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the panel's informal en bane opinion on
questions of first impression requires further thought and development and therefore should
be considered through formal en banc review).
294. William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1723, 1726 (2005).
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Amy Coney Barrett has argued that strict application of the law of the
circuit rule violates due process because of its preclusive effect; it prevents
parties from arguing that an opinion in an earlier case to which they were
not parties should be overruled. 295 To the extent these statements are
accurate, they apply only to "published" circuit precedent. But the majority
of federal circuit court opinions are "unpublished," or nonprecedential. 296
The prevalence of nonprecedential opinions has already largely undermined
the law of the circuit rule.297 As I have argued elsewhere, it would be better
for the courts to acknowledge and clearly define the status of these opinions
in the system of precedent. I have proposed redefining nonprecedential
opinions as "overrulable" opinions and "published" opinions as fully
precedential opinions.298
Under this proposal, overrulable opinions would be subject to overruling
by a later three-judge panel in a fully precedential opinion, and then fully
precedential opinions would be subject to the law of the circuit rule and
overrulable only by the court sitting en banc. 299 By eliminating a category
of precedent that can be fully ignored (and until recently, not even cited in
some circuits), 30 0 a panel would not have to choose between issuing all-or-
nothing precedents. Most opinions would probably be issued as
overrulable, but they would be binding, legitimate circuit precedents,
subject to overruling by a process considerably less onerous than formal en
banc review. The law of the circuit rule could then be relatively strictly
applied to fully precedential opinions. I say relatively because there is no
reason to jettison the present exceptions for panel overrulings of opinions
that have been directly undermined by intervening superior authority.
Giving all federal circuit opinions precedential value, albeit most weak and
only a few strong, would obviate the need for informal en banc review.
This type of fundamental reevaluation of the hierarchy of circuit
precedent is not likely to occur.30 1 Operating in the existing environment,
the easiest approaches to informal en banc review offer two absolutes:
eliminate informal en banc review altogether or allow courts to continue to
use it without any formal limitations, as they do now. Neither absolute is
satisfying. Denying circuit courts reasonably efficient ways of dealing with
matters that do not clearly call for formal en banc review is neither practical
nor advisable. But allowing unbounded use of informal en banc review
results in the proliferation of the problems the process creates.
Accordingly, until the federal circuit courts are willing to reassess the
295. Barrett, supra note 3.
296. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra
note 71, at 48 tbl.S-3.
297. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of nonprecedential
opinions on principles of stare decisis).
298. Sloan, supra note 164, at 929-3 1; see also DuVivier, supra note 225, at 418 (arguing
in favor of retaining nonprecedential opinions as a less binding form of precedent).
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categories of precedent, informal en banc procedures should be allowed in
certain limited situations, but both the standards governing use of the
informal en banc review and the process to be followed when the procedure
is invoked must be clearly articulated and consistent across circuits. The
authorization of informal review requires the federal appellate courts to act
in their judicial capacity, but the procedural requirements for such review
could be set out in local court rules or internal operating procedures.
A. Clarifying the Standards Governing Informal En Banc Review
The circuits that use informal en banc review need to clarify the
standards governing use of the procedure. Presently, only the District of
Columbia Circuit has articulated in any meaningful way the appropriate use
of informal en banc review.30 2 The other circuits should do the same.
These standards should expressly define when informal en banc review is
not appropriate, as well as when it is.
Specifically, the federal appellate courts should reaffirm their
commitment to the law of the circuit rule by stating that informal en banc
review is not appropriately used when a panel seeks to overrule earlier
panel precedent that is in force in the circuit and has not been invalidated by
intervening superior authority. 30 3 This limitation should apply even when
the panel believes that overruling an earlier case would be more consistent
with precedent from the Supreme Court or other circuits. The prerogative
of overruling prior circuit precedent should remain with the court sitting in
its formal en banc capacity except when that precedent has been directly
undermined by intervening superior authority, such as a circuit formal en
banc opinion, a Supreme Court opinion, a federal statute or regulation, or
state law (in cases involving interpretation of state law).
The federal appellate courts should then expressly limit the use of
informal en banc review to cases in which formal en banc review is not
clearly required. This would include cases in which a panel opinion creates
or continues a circuit split, formally overrules precedent that has been
directly undermined by intervening superior authority, clarifies an apparent
inconsistency in circuit precedent, modifies an existing rule without
overruling prior precedent, addresses a question of first impression or
announces a rule or policy where none existed before, or resolves a case
with unusual procedural history or some other unique aspect that does not
involve overruling circuit precedent.
Why do these limits make sense? In all of the situations in which
informal en banc review can legitimately be used, the panel at least
arguably could act without en banc acquiescence. All circuits say that a
panel's authority to overrule a prior panel decision rendered invalid by later
superior authority is an exception to the law of the circuit rule. 30 4 In other
302. Policy Statement, supra note 58.
303. See supra note 28 (collecting cases stating the law of the circuit rule).
304. See supra note 34 (collecting cases).
[Vol. 78
THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK
cases, even if the panel could act on its own, it may be advantageous to
obtain the acquiescence of the full court.
When it comes to overruling cases that have not been undermined by
superior authority, however, the courts should not use informal en banc
review. The courts should make the law of the circuit rule a strong rule in
this circumstance to maintain public confidence in the courts. Because the
courts make and enforce rules of precedent, strict adherence to those rules is
necessary for judicial legitimacy.30 5 It would be virtually impossible to
obtain Supreme Court review of the law of the circuit rule itself or a
circuit's adherence to it even assuming that the Supreme Court's
supervisory power gives it the authority to review the rule. 30 6 If one panel
failed to follow the decision of an earlier circuit panel and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the case, it is unlikely in the extreme that the
Supreme Court would address the law of the circuit rule. Instead, the Court
would address the substantive merits of the case. 30 7 In effect, therefore, the
circuit courts are solely responsible for both articulating and enforcing the
rule of horizontal stare decisis. Individual judges occasionally take their
colleagues to task for perceived failures to follow the law of the circuit
rule, 30 8 but those cases are not the norm. Even if a judge thinks her
colleagues are not following the rule as they should, she will not often
address the issue publicly out of concern for the collegiality of the court. 309
Further, an individual judge cannot change the outcome if the majority of
the panel declines to follow the law of the circuit rule. 310
Given that context, it becomes clear that faithful adherence to the law of
the circuit rule is necessary to avoid both the actuality and appearance of
arbitrary decision making. The legitimacy of the courts depends on the
appearance of fairness they bring to the adjudicatory process. 311 Litigants
must feel that they are fairly treated. When a panel in one case says it must
follow circuit precedent even if it disagrees with it3 12 and in another takes it
305. See Shannon, supra note 220, at 690-91.
306. See Sloan, supra note 15, at 737 n.125 (explaining supervisory power).
307. See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ticktin, 490 U.S. 82, 83 n.1 (1989) (noting
the panel's overruling of a prior case, but not commenting on the informal en banc
procedure), rev'g 832 F.2d 1438 (7th Cir. 1987).
308. See, e.g., Watts v. Burkhart, No. 89-6160, 1991 WL 261224, at *10-11 (6th Cir.
Dec. 13, 1991) (Contie, J., dissenting), vacated, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(overruling Manion v. Michigan Board of Medicine, 765 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1985)).
309. See supra notes 160-63 (discussing the importance of collegiality on the court).
310. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1017 (noting that an individual circuit judge has
little authority because substantive decisions require at least two judges to agree).
311. See CAPPALLI, supra note 16, §§ 7.03-.06, at 80-83.
312. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 432 (5th Cir.
2008) (acknowledging the state's arguments regarding waiver but deeming itself bound by
prior panel precedent, whether right or wrong); United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717,
732 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that if the panel were the first to address the issue presented in the
case, it might have reached a different conclusion, but deeming itself bound by prior panel
opinions pending overruling by the court en banc or the Supreme Court).
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upon itself to overrule prior precedent, 313 the courts ultimately shortchange
their legitimacy in the name of expediency.
One criticism of this approach is that it is too strict. Disallowing
informal en banc procedures to overrule outlier or clearly wrong precedent
will encourage panels to go to extraordinary lengths to distinguish cases or
avoid language in prior opinions as dicta. There is a difference between
overruling a single case that is contrary to the weight of circuit precedent
and resolving a conflict between two competing lines of authority. Perhaps
the federal appellate courts should not use informal en banc procedures in
the latter of these situations, but why not allow it in the former? And
adherence to precedent that is substantively wrong can hardly be said to
advance legitimacy or fairness. Obviously, there are judgment calls
involved in these determinations, but a judge's job is to make discernments
among cases, and the judgment about whether a case requires en banc
review is just another of those situations. Also, if all of the judges agree
with the outcome, what difference does it make whether the result is
reached through formal or informal en banc review?
These are all good points, but on balance, the better course of action is
for the courts to resist using informal en bane review to overrule cases
unless those cases have been directly invalidated by intervening superior
authority. Most importantly, the legitimacy concerns articulated above
trump the efficiency advantages of informal en banc review in this context.
Additionally, for outlier cases or clearly wrong precedent, the effort
involved in formal en banc review should not be significantly greater than
that of informal en banc review. 314 This is especially true if all of the
judges agree with the result. The agreement of all judges on the court does
not render formal en banc review superfluous. The fact that all members of
a panel agree does not mean that a single judge can decide the case alone.
Just because the justices of the Supreme Court may be unanimous in a
decision does not mean a case does not merit certiorari review. By the
same token, even if all judges on the court would agree with the result of an
en banc determination, that does not mean that formal en banc review itself
is unnecessary. 315
Moreover, the number of cases at issue is still relatively small enough at
this point that the additional effort of formal en banc review should not be
excessively burdensome.316 For those circuits (most notably the Seventh)
in which informal en banc review is used so frequently for overruling panel
313. See, e.g., Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 784 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005); see also cases cited
supra Part III.B. 1.
314. Statistics from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts indicate that the federal
appellate courts decide a small number of formal en banc cases without additional briefing or
argument. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR, supra note 71, at 46 tbl.S-1.
315. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 3, at 1034 (noting that formal en banc opinions that
affirm the panel operate to increase the confidence of both the parties and the public in the
result).
316. See supra p. 738, fig.2.
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precedent that it would be unworkable to employ formal en banc review
instead, the answer may be to reduce the number of judges who must
participate in formal en banc review. The largest federal circuits are
already empowered to adopt rules authorizing formal en banc review with
fewer than all of the judges on the circuit, 317 although only the Ninth
Circuit has adopted the "limited" en banc option so far.318 This procedure
is not perfect,319 but no procedure is. To avoid the problems that using
informal en banc review to overrule prior panel precedent creates, the
relative merits of using fewer judges for formal en banc review must be
considered.
The courts would be well advised to learn the lesson that nonprecedential
opinions provide. Short-term expediencies in a small number of cases have
the potential to turn into a morass of problems.320 If informal en banc
review were to overtake formal en banc review, as has already happened in
two circuits,32 1 the courts could very well face the same legitimacy
problems in this context that they do with nonprecedential opinions now.
Rather than follow that road, they should limit the use of informal en banc
review now.
B. Establishing Procedures Governing Informal En Banc Review
Once the federal appellate courts limit the cases eligible for informal en
banc review, they must clarify the procedures for utilizing the procedure,
including the number of judges who must concur in the action, the required
manifestation of that concurrence, and the method of indicating such
concurrence in the panel opinion.
Informal en banc review should not be used unless the full court
unanimously agrees with the proposed disposition. Because informal en
banc review involves changing the status quo,322 panels should not be able
to go forward with a proposed disposition without full agreement on the
court. The agreement should extend not only to the specific action for
which informal en banc review is sought, but also with the ultimate result
and reasoning of the case. As the dissent from denial of rehearing en banc
in a Seventh Circuit case noted, informal en banc approval indicates to the
public that the full court approves of both the holding and the rationale. 323
The type of disagreement apparent in the Tenth Circuit's Atencio decision,
317. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (providing that
"[a]ny court of appeals having more than 15 active judges... may perform its en banc
function by such number of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of
the court of appeals").
318. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. See generally Rymer, supra note 72.
319. For a critique of the Ninth Circuit's practice, see generally Rymer, supra note 72.
320. See generally Sloan, supra note 15; Sloan, supra note 164.
321. See supra p. 738-39, fig.2 (Second Circuit table and Seventh Circuit table).
322. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing how informal en banc
review changes the status quo in ways that votes on formal en banc review do not).
323. Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1368 n.* (7th Cir. 1988) (Ripple, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
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in which all judges agreed that an earlier case was wrong but were split on
what the new rule should be, should disqualify an opinion from informal en
banc review. 324  Further, informal en banc review should require
affirmative acquiescence of all judges on the court. Failure to object should
not be sufficient.
Finally, the indication of informal en banc approval should not be in a
footnote. There is simply no reason for the courts to treat informal en banc
review as a subsidiary matter or to hide the fact of such review in a
footnote. Informal en banc action should be prominently noted in the
opinion, both to facilitate accurate research and to make the court's action
as transparent as formal en banc review. The text of the opinion should
state the reason for seeking informal en banc review and the affirmative
approval of the full court. If the informal en banc action affects the
precedential value of prior precedent, the case or cases should be identified
by name and citation to the extent possible. 325
C. Implementing Procedures for Informal En Banc Review
All circuits that have an informal en banc procedure should authorize it
by en banc judicial opinion with meaningful discussion of the basis for the
rule, not unsupported statements of their authority to change the law 326 or
cryptic, unexplained citations to prior cases.327 Courts have the authority to
alter or amend rules of precedent acting in their judicial capacity.328 If they
are going to use informal en banc review, they should exercise their judicial
power to authorize the procedure and identify its legitimate uses.329 Once a
circuit articulates the basis for-and limits on-its informal en banc
procedure, it would not have to do so again in every subsequent opinion;
later opinions could then simply cite the opinion that originally articulates
the procedure.
324. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text (discussing the intense disagreement
among the judges over proper disposition of the case).
325. Obviously, a panel may not be aware of every previously decided case in the circuit
and therefore may not be able to list each affected case in the informal en banc opinion.
Nevertheless, every effort in that regard should be made. Of course, adopting this
requirement is not the same as following it. The Seventh Circuit presently requires such
disclosure in its Local Rule 40(e), but not all Seventh Circuit informal en bane cases contain
the required information.
326. See, e.g., Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265,268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
327. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the development of informal en bane review in
individual circuits).
328. See Sloan, supra note 15, at 712-13 (noting that courts traditionally established rules
of precedent using adjudicatory, rather than rulemaking, power); see also Miller v. Gammie,
335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (creating an exception to the law of the circuit
rule).
329. For an example of use of adjudicatory power to make rules of precedent, see Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), in which the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which had recently been formed from the Fifth Circuit's
rib, adopted Fifth Circuit precedent as binding in the new circuit and indicated that
adjudication, not rulemaking, was the appropriate mechanism for making that type of
jurisprudential decision. Id. at 1207.
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Courts should not rely on local rules to authorize the procedure, in effect,
using local rules to alter the rules of precedent the way they have with
nonprecedential opinions. 330 On the surface, this might seem appealing
because a procedural rule is a good way to spell out detailed review
procedures and to state a prospective rule of general applicability. But
approaching informal en banc review this way is inconsistent with the
purpose of local rules. Further, from the judiciary's perspective, it is a
dangerous way to implement informal en banc review. Because rules are
promulgated with delegated legislative authority, using them to make rules
of precedent leaves the courts open to further regulation on the matter by
Congress. 331  The courts have already opened themselves up to this
possibility by purporting to define the value of nonprecedential opinions by
local rule.332 If they do not want to further risk ceding judicial power to the
legislative branch, they should not authorize informal en banc review
procedures in their local rules.
Once informal en banc review is authorized by en banc opinion,
however, the use of local rules or internal operating procedures would be
appropriate, although not absolutely necessary, to implement the ministerial
aspects of the process (including, but not limited to, the manner in which a
panel initiates informal en banc review, the materials to be provided to the
off-panel judges, and the amount of time permitted for review). The
administrative aspects of the process could also be established through the
en banc opinion authorizing informal en banc review. The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure would not be an appropriate vehicle for implementing
the process because informal en banc review is not presently used in all
circuits. If all circuits were to adopt informal en banc review, however,
having uniform standards in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
might be desirable. 333
Regardless of the method of implementing informal en banc review, it is
important that the federal appellate courts conceptualize the procedure as
unusual and extraordinary, not as a routine occurrence. In this regard, if
putting the implementing procedures in local rules makes it seem routine,
the rules should not be used in this way. On the other hand, both FRAP 35
and local rules state that en banc review is an extraordinary step, and the
courts seem to have little difficulty avoiding routine use of en banc review.
Therefore, it would seem that the same would be true of informal en banc
review; once the policy of sparing use is articulated, the courts should be
able to apply the policy.
330. Shannon, supra note 220, at 649; Sloan, supra note 164, at 934.
331. Sloan, supra note 15, at 733-46.
332. Sloan, supra note 164, at 937-40.
333. Cf id. at 927-29 (arguing that development of consistent standards for issuance of
nonprecedential opinions through FRAP would be desirable).
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CONCLUSION
The use of informal en bane procedures is legitimate and even salutary in
certain circumstances, but the lack of standards for use of informal en bane
review and the inconsistencies in procedures across circuits are problematic.
The federal appellate courts have already learned in the context of
nonprecedential opinions that developing exceptions to established rules of
precedent in a piecemeal way is a recipe for disaster. What starts off as an
unusual circumstance that develops idiosyncratically in each circuit can
become the proverbial elephant in the living room. The federal appellate
courts should not allow the development of informal en bane procedures to
take this route. Ultimately, they would do well to reevaluate the hierarchy
of precedent as it presently exists to obviate the need for informal en bane
review. Barring that unlikely occurrence, they should acknowledge the
existence, develop consistent standards for employing, and exercise
restraint in using informal en banc review before the exception gradually
swallows the rule.
APPENDIX A: INFORMAL EN BANC CASES BY CIRCUIT
This appendix lists informal en banc cases by circuit in descending order
from latest to earliest. Pinpoint citations refer to the page and, as
appropriate, footnote indicating that the panel used informal en banc
review. Criminal cases are indicated with an asterisk (*). The nature of the
action taken in the case is indicated by the following letter codes:
I = Creating or continuing intercircuit conflict
Q = Resolving a question of first impression or stating a rule or policy
where none existed before
C = Resolving intracircuit conflict or ambiguity or modifying a rule
without overruling prior cases (including rejecting prior panel precedent
without overruling it)
U = Overruling precedent undermined by intervening superior authority
O = Overruling panel precedent presently in force
M = Miscellaneous
See Section l.B. 1, supra, for more discussion of these categories and the
methodology used to compile and categorize cases.
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